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Abstract 
 
 For most of the century following his death in 1900, the three things most people 
knew about Friedrich Nietzsche were false: that he “killed God”; that his work was a 
blueprint for Nazi ideology; and that he died a madman of peretic syphilis. These 
distortions originated with the ignorant, were embraced by the vindictive, and then 
persistently reiterated by the misled, including some of Nietzsche’s most prestigious 
admirers.  
 At the heart of everything Nietzsche has written is a profound awareness of the 
inseparability of all apparent contradictions and the rejection of dualistic split thinking, 
whether it is the Platonic ideal, Kant’s subject/object dichotomy, or any other of the 
absolutes put forward by philosophers since the beginning of Western philosophy in 
Presocratic Greece. When Nietzsche writes that he prefers to be misunderstood, it is 
because he understands the fluidity of language and meaning, the multiplicity of 
perspectives, and the inescapable subjectivity of human thought.  
 This thesis views the often enigmatic nature of Nietzsche’s words and ideas 
through the twin lenses of Taoist philosophical thought and the systems of the Presocratic 
physikoi. I do not claim that Nietzsche thought himself a Taoist. My methodology, 
described in some detail in Chapter I, is a blend of scholarly research and creative 
intuition, a formula that enables me to understand my subjects on their terms. One way to 
explain the congruency of ideas between Nietzsche, the Presocratic Greeks, and Eastern 
philosophy is to ask whether there was a migration of ideas from China to ancient Greece 
  
 
and from there into the mind of Nietzsche. But another way of viewing such a 
congruency is to ask whether these are ideas that arise naturally when, in any time and in 
any space, we look beyond the limitations of dualistic thinking: hence the “untimely co-
arising” in the title of this work. 
 These are times when we are uncertain about nearly everything, when we are as 
quick to condemn a “lie” as we are reluctant to accept the “truth.” “Why not untruth 
instead?” Nietzsche asks in Beyond Good and Evil.  
 When we begin with uncertainty, we are in reality. 
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 Chapter I 
 
Methodology 
 
Gather what you can from coincidence. 
~ Bob Dylan, “Desolation Row” 
 
 
Truth to Poets 
 David Potter, writing on the subject of narrative validity and historiography in the 
Classics, cites Pliny the Younger recounting a story heard at a dinner party,  
I trust the person who told it, although what is truth to poets? Still, the 
person who told the story is one of whom you might think well if you 
were to write history. (9.33.1, qtd. in Potter 5)  
 
Pliny’s good-natured remark seems to question the truthfulness of poets while at the same 
time crediting this particular poet with a kind of cultural reliability.  
 What is poetic truth, anyway? In “Ode on a Grecian Urn” John Keats equates 
truth with beauty (Ferguson et al. 939). Shelley, of course, famously claims in the last 
line of A Defence of Poetry that “Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world” 
(568). In “Asphodel, That Greeny Flower,” William Carlos Williams claims that poetry 
contains truth essential to our survival: “It is difficult/to get the news from poems/yet 
men die miserably every day/for lack of what is found there” (Ferguson et al. 1283). 
Taoists say that “knowledge of Tao lodges in the same part of the mind as poetry,” which 
is why ancient Taoist texts like the Tao te Ching are often written in verse: “There is the 
same quick perception” (Deng, 365 Tao 63).  
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 In Poetics, Aristotle judges poetic truth to be superior to historical truth because it 
is not bound as history is to a particular time and place, and therefore possesses timeless 
and universal value.1 Aristotle uses the same criteria to evaluate truth in poetry as in 
rhetoric: the ability to arouse passion in an audience by inspiring trust in the moral 
character (ethos) of the poet or the rhetorician.  
 All of this implies a synergy that goes beyond beauty or truth or even language 
and history—a whole greater than the sum of its parts. Perhaps the similarity between 
truth and poetry is most apparent in their similar reception, which, for poetry as for truth, 
is often as not disbelief and ridicule. D.H. Lawrence declared: “Never trust the artist, trust 
the tale” (Cargill 5).  
 With his Pliny the Younger story, Potter introduces the issues of subjectivity and 
language in the writing of history and acknowledges “the inherent contradiction between 
the desire for accurate representation and the impossibility of absolute certainty” (6) 
because of subjective judgment and expression. The resulting tension is what gives 
history its “abiding fascination” (9). I would add that the resulting tension is what gives 
both history and life, their truth and their poetry.   
 In his late notebooks Nietzsche has this to say about the tension between facts and 
subjectivity: 
                                                 
     1. Poetics IX: “It is, moreover, evident from what has been said, that it is not the 
function of the poet to relate what has happened, but what may happen—what is possible 
according to the law of probability or necessity. The poet and the historian differ not by 
writing in verse or in prose…. The true difference is that one relates what has happened, 
the other what may happen. Poetry, therefore, is a more philosophical and a higher thing 
than history: for poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular….” (Aristotle 
429-430)  
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‘There are only facts’ – I would say: no, facts are just what there aren’t, 
there are only interpretations. We cannot determine any fact ‘in itself’: 
perhaps it’s nonsensical to want to do such a thing. ‘Everything is 
subjective,’ you say: but that itself is an interpretation, for the ‘subject’ is 
not something given but a fiction added on, tucked behind…. Inasmuch as 
the word ‘knowledge’ has any meaning at all, the world is knowable: but it 
is variously interpretable; it has no meaning behind it, but countless 
meanings. ‘Perspectivism’. (Writings from Late Notebooks 7[60], 139)2 
 
 My research methods for this thesis are based on principles expressed by the 
subjects of my thesis—Friedrich Nietzsche and Taoist philosophy. These principles 
include the pursuit of an encompassing whole that embraces contradiction; the 
acknowledgment and acceptance of shifting perspectives; a respect for creative intuition, 
independent thought, and what Nietzsche refers to as the Greek skill in “the art of fruitful 
learning” (PTAG 30).   
 The text I have selected to unlock and illuminate my thesis--my ‘source book’-- is 
Nietzsche’s Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks (PTAG),3 a long essay that 
Nietzsche wrote in 1873 on the pre-Socratic philosophers of the 6th and 5th centuries BCE 
during the same period as The Birth of Tragedy (1872) and Untimely Meditations (1873-
1876)4. In the essay Nietzsche expresses an innovation that translator Marianne Cowan 
describes as his “intuitive certainty, resting on a numinous, incontrovertible source in his 
                                                 
     2. “Notebook 7, end of 1886 – spring 1887” (139) 
  
     3.  Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks was never completed and only 
posthumously published but Nietzsche had a clean copy of it made with the intention of 
expanding it into a book for publication according to Cowan (PTAG 4-5). The essay is 
based in part on the “pre-Platonic” lecture series Nietzsche delivered at the University of 
Basel between 1872 and 1876 (Whitlock xiv).  
 
     4. All citations from Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks are from Marianne 
Cowan’s 1962 translation. 
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own being, that the Greeks had achieved the highest type of culture that the world had 
seen” (2). Cowan cites from the Naumann edition of Nietzsche’s Werke5 that for 
Nietzsche the Presocratics were “the collective representatives of the eternal intuitive 
type, the discoverers of ‘the beautiful possibilities of life’” (2-3).  
 According to Cowan, intuitive certainty encompasses intuition—an immediate, 
that is, non-mediated sensation—as well as the cognitive mediation that certainty rests 
upon.6 In other words, intuitive certainty relies on a pairing that appears contradictory. 
The very concept of contradictoriness, as we shall see, is not only important but central to 
Nietzsche, the Presocratics, and Taoist thought alike. 
 
Quellenforschung 
 Historically, the approach to researching texts in literature and philosophy since 
the nineteenth century begins with “source research” (Quellenforschung). Potter, who 
refers to the study of sources as “lion taming” (90), offers a useful outline of its goals and 
processes. Briefly, traditional source research attempts to reduce a number of parallel 
accounts to a single event; to explain why an author of an account is not necessarily a 
witness to the event; to locate sources for texts written centuries after events; to reveal 
how parts or elements of research are composed to tell a story; and to enable 
reconstruction of a narrative from fragments (91). 
 Clearly, researching contextual material such as biography, history, secondary 
                                                 
     5. Leipzig, 1894ff 
 
     6. John Hamilton comments that the phrase “intuitive certainty is almost oxymoronic: 
a non-mediated mediation” (thesis note 26 January 2016). 
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sources, and chronology is a valuable technique for corroborating and establishing the 
authenticity and genealogy of ancient texts from Homer to the Old Testament. As a sole 
methodology, however, this approach ends by focusing excessively on pedigree and not 
enough on the content of the work itself. Nietzsche translator J.M. Kennedy makes this 
point in his introduction to the 1964 edition of The Complete Works of Friedrich 
Nietzsche: 
The standard of culture to be aimed at by the man of genius Nietzsche had 
in mind was to be found in the model literary and artistic works which 
have come down to us from ancient Greece. To understand these works, of 
course, the classical authors had to be studied in the original, and the 
methods of teaching then in vogue paid too much attention to 
inconsequential points (e.g. variant readings) instead of dealing with the 
subject in a broad-minded philosophical spirit. Nietzsche endeavored to 
counteract this tendency…by outlining a much vaster conception of 
philology…laying stress upon the artistic results which would accrue if 
the science were applied on a wider scale—results which would be of a 
much higher order than those obtained by the narrow pedantry then 
prevailing. (viii, emphasis added) 
 
It is not that validating source material is not desirable but that it may also be necessary 
to go beyond a need for rigorous validation to derive substance from the ideas contained 
in the texts themselves however fragmentary and, possibly impossible to authenticate. 
Sometimes a leap of faith may be required to achieve intuitive certainty.  
 It is no coincidence that out of “an infinite desire to resist final answers” Friedrich 
Schlegel7 deliberately mimicked the incomprehensibility of fragmentary ancient texts in 
Critical Fragments (Hamilton, “European Romanticisms” 2). As Hamilton says:  
                                                 
7. Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1859) German poet, literary critic, philosopher, 
philologist, “Indologist”--one of the main figures of the early German Romantics 
centered in Jena. 
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The reader of the fragments must deal with a profound irony: often an 
interpretation of one fragment would contradict an interpretation of 
another. The fragments, taken as a whole, frequently appear to work at 
cross-purposes with each other . . . as an incentive [and] as a strategy to 
keep the reader reading, to make the text as indispensable as a classical 
work . . . the absolute can never be reached because if it is reached, it is 
determined, and therefore not the absolute. (5) 
 
We may be better able to comprehend the ancient fragments as a whole using a similar 
technique. Rather than seeking to establish a definitive, “absolute” interpretation based 
on endless authentication, it might be more fruitful to keep the door open to a more 
intuitive approach.  
 In response to the limitations of source research, the New Critics of the mid-
twentieth century proposed divorcing ancient texts from “extrinsic considerations” and 
instead concentrating on the work itself. Taken to extremes, a more serious error 
sometimes ensues, “that of ignoring any information not in the work itself” (Guerin 16). 
In response to the New Critics, Kenneth Burke8 in 1946 called for “a criticism as 
capacious as the object it criticizes” (Leitch et al. 1270). “The greater the range and depth 
of considerations the more the task of the critic is fulfilled” Burke asserts, provided 
writers are explicit in stating their motives (1272). This is a rare acknowledgment of the 
cultural, academic, and professional biases that sometimes play a part in scholarly 
research. 
 Not as provocative (nor as well-known) as Burke, Oscar Cargill spent a long yet 
modest career during the first half of the twentieth century chairing New York 
University’s English department, writing and teaching literature. Cargill came relatively 
                                                 
      8. Burke is described as a “wild and wooly autodidact” (Norton Theory and Criticism 
1269). 
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late to the controversy of the eclectic approach that Burke stirred up twenty years earlier 
but he spent that time giving the idea serious consideration and, in my view, expresses it 
better. He surely draws on American pragmatism, a movement originating in the United 
States around 1870 that rejected all forms of absolutism in favor of valuing ideas in terms 
of their functionality and fruitfulness in “lived experience.”  
 In his considered response to the New Critics, Cargill published a collection of 
critical essays, Toward a Pluralistic Criticism (1965) that begins with this opening 
sentence:  
The function of the critic is to make the past functional, for unless it can 
be used, it is deader than death itself. (3) 
 
“What is the past?” Cargill goes on to ask. “Where does it begin and where does it end?” 
The past is time,” he offers, “or what we live in.” We live in all of it, all at once, Cargill 
asserts, making no distinction between what we ordinarily view separately as the past, the 
present or the future. To illustrate his point, Cargill points out that the great masterpieces 
of literature, regardless of when, where, or in what language they are produced, give him 
the impression of being “companion works.” The reason for this impression, says Cargill, 
is continuity, “the most valuable element in time.” The task of critics, then, is to trace that 
continuity in a “pluralistic universe, a universe without stability” and to approach every 
work of art “with every faculty, with every technique, with every method” we can 
command” (14).  
 Nietzsche’s notion of time is also one of “utter continuity” (Bishop et al. 55).  
This sense of continuity explains the proximity--one might even call it companionship—
that Nietzsche experienced with the Presocratics. Such an understanding of time is found 
throughout Taoist philosophy that also views time as a continuum.  
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 In Nietzsche’s foreword to “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” 
in Untimely Meditations, he writes:  
We need history, certainly, but we need it for reasons different from those 
for which the idler in the garden of knowledge needs it…. We need it…. 
for the sake of life and action, not so as to turn comfortably away from life 
and action, let alone for the purpose of extenuating the self-seeking life 
and the base and cowardly action. We want to serve history only to the 
extent that history serves life.9 (59) 
 
 Nietzsche insists “that we can never be free from the past. Its timelessness will 
never cease to be a power for the times” (Hamilton, Soliciting Darkness 61). Similarly, in 
philosophical Taoism10 the past, the present, and the future are all part of a circular 
continuum. Choose any point or event on this circle and you will find that it has the 
qualities of being, of having been, and of what will be—regardless of where you find 
yourself on the circle.  
 Long before the twentieth and twenty-first century critics of Quellenforschung, 
Nietzsche argues against the tradition that has its roots in his own century when he scoffs 
at those “who prefer to spend their time on Egyptian or Persian philosophy rather than on 
Greek, on the grounds that the former are more ‘original’ and in any event older.” The 
“quest” for beginnings is “idle” Nietzsche insists because what we are seeking is not 
found at the earliest point but at the highest point. The origins and beginnings of 
philosophy are not the point. The point is how much higher you can go: “What matters in 
                                                 
     9.  Nietzsche’s foreword opens with a reference to Goethe from Dichtung und 
Wahrzeit (“Poetry and Truth”): “In any case, I hate everything that merely instructs me 
without augmenting or directly invigorating my activity” (59).  
 
     10. Philosophical Taoism sometimes called tao-chia or tao-jia--as distinguished from 
religious Taoism: tao-chiao or tao-jiao--is the original form of Taoist thought and is the 
subject of this thesis.  
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all things is the higher levels” (PTAG 30). Anything less is pedantry, learning for 
learning’s sake, a kind of intellectual materialism; the perils of “an unrestrained thirst for 
knowledge for its own sake,” which “barbarizes” men as surely as a hatred of knowledge. 
 In Nietzsche’s inaugural lecture at Basel in 1869 he cites Seneca’s Epistle to 
Lucillius in Epistulae Morales on the subject of learning for learning’s sake:  
1. … this eagerness to learn … should be regulated, so that it may not get 
in its own way. Things are not to be gathered at random; nor should they 
be greedily attacked in the mass; one will arrive at a knowledge of the 
whole by studying the parts. (Epistle 108:1, 231, emphasis added)  
 
And so we return to fragments. Rolf-Peter Horstman reminds us: “…given our situation, 
every truth is defined by [a] necessarily incomplete context. Thus every truth is a partial 
truth or a perspectival fiction” (Horstmann 192-193).  
 Every truth is a fragment and every fragment of the truth is also true. This is the 
great correspondence of Nietzsche, the Presocratics, and Taoist thought. Every part is 
part of a whole. There is no truth without untruth and so the same may be said of 
untruth—both are contained in the greater whole. “The truth, the whole truth and nothing 
but the truth” of sworn testimony is a statement in opposition to itself because if it is 
“nothing but the truth” it cannot be the “whole truth.” 
 
Fruitful Learning 
 Of the Presocratics, Nietzsche says, “Whatever they learned, they wanted to live 
through, immediately” (PTAG 31). Nietzsche may have been thinking of these words of 
Seneca’s further on in Epistle 108:  
37. … my advice is this – … that we should not hunt out archaic or far-
fetched words and eccentric metaphors and figures of speech, but that we 
should seek precepts which will help us, utterances of courage and spirit 
10 
 
 
 
which may at once be turned into facts. We should so learn them that 
words may become deeds. 36. … I hold that no man has treated mankind 
worse than he who has studied philosophy as if it were some marketable 
trade, who lives in a different manner from that which he advises….A 
teacher like that can help me no more than a sea-sick pilot can be efficient 
in a storm….what good is a frightened and vomiting steersman to me? 
And how much greater, think you, is the storm of life than that which 
tosses any ship! One must steer, not talk….I shall show you how men can 
prove their words to be their own: it is by doing what they have been 
talking about. (Seneca 253-55, emphasis added)11 
 
For Nietzsche too, philosophy is living inevitably; living through, immediately is a fair 
description of philosophical Taoism as well. Taoism is all about what can only be known 
by living it. 
 What were Nietzsche’s own resources for the pre-Socratic Greeks he writes about 
in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks in 1874—Thales, Anaximander, 
Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras? The problem we encounter with a reliance on 
‘later’ philosophers and commentators is neatly summarized in Kirk & Raven (The 
Presocratic Philosophers, 1957) who report that Plato was “notoriously lax in his 
quotations from all sources,” frequently mixing “quotation with paraphrase” with an 
attitude toward his predecessors that was more frequently ironic than objective (1);  
Aristotle’s judgements were “often distorted by his view of earlier philosophy as a 
stumbling progress towards the truth Aristotle himself revealed” (3). It was not until a 
full millennium later that the Neoplatonist Simplicius12 felt the need to set the words of 
the Presocratics down in detail and at great length, in order to preserve them (1). We 
                                                 
     11. Seneca himself may have been thinking of the Presocratics. 
 
     12. Simplicius of Cilicia (c. 490 – c. 560 CE) the last of the Neoplatonist philosophers. 
The 2010 edition of Richard McKirahan’s Philosophy Before Socrates reports that new 
discoveries and scholarship suggest that it was Theophrastus who was the ultimate source 
for Simplicius (6). 
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might safely assume that Nietzsche’s own sources in 1874 included Simplicius as well as 
Plato (Brobjer, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Context 27) and Aristotle (57).  
 In PTAG, Nietzsche writes that while the Greeks of the pre-Socratic age found a 
great deal to learn from the Orient they did not merely import the ancient philosophies of 
the East into Greece. Rather, they made it their own by applying it to their own place and 
time.  For the most part, pre-Socratic philosophers did not become followers of Zoroaster 
or of Buddha; instead, they mastered the ability to “absorb other living cultures” and to 
“pick up the spear and throw it onward from the point where others had left it” 
whereupon it becomes a Greek spear. This is what Nietzsche calls the Greek “art of 
fruitful learning” (PTAG 30).  The Greeks did not try to reinvent what they borrowed 
from others, but were interested in “fulfilling, enhancing, elevating and purifying” these 
elements. We should develop this skill ourselves, Nietzsche advises, and learn to use 
what we can “find and learn abroad” as footholds to climb higher. According to 
Nietzsche, what the pre-Socratic Greeks produced with their philosophy was no less than 
“the archetypes of philosophic thought” (31).  
 We can see how Nietzsche applies fruitful learning by his assessment of Thales. It 
is an idle quest for beginnings, he writes, when what you are really looking for are not 
simply the physical facts about a mathematician from Miletus called Thales--where he 
traveled or did not travel; what he may or may not have said, discovered, or written—but 
rather the ideas that persist and endure. This is the spear we are obliged to pick up, 
examine, and weigh, right here where we find it, in the present, however long ago it fell. 
We don’t really need to know the precise provenance of the spear, who made it, who it 
belonged to, what the battle was about—to use the spear ourselves.   
12 
 
 
 
 In the course of source research over the ages many discoveries and insights are 
both attributed to Thales and denied Thales—on navigation, on the measurement of the 
Pyramids, in mathematics, and astronomy. Kirk & Raven conclude that “there was 
profound doubt in antiquity about Thales” (85) and that in all probability Thales “did not 
write a book”—noting, however, that it is still possible that just such a book may have 
been destroyed in the fire at the Alexandrian library (86). Simplicius flatly states that 
Thales “left nothing behind” (84). Nevertheless, the importance of the ideas correctly or 
incorrectly attributed to Thales--the ability to accurately predict eclipses (79) and to 
measure the pyramids by their shadows (83)—is what provides the means to go further. If 
what we really want is “truth,” Nietzsche insists, it does not consist of correct facts about 
Thales’ life. If all we are seeking are facts, then “why not untruth instead? And 
uncertainty? Even ignorance?” Is truth the problem or are we the problem, he asks (BGE 
2003 5). 
 In the first Preface to PTAG, Nietzsche rejoices in an era where such 
philosophical systems, “even if erroneous” existed at all: “So this has existed—once, at 
least—and is therefore a possibility, this way of life, this way of looking at the human 
scene” (PTAG 24). For instance, Thales’ cosmological proposition “that water is the 
primal origin and the womb of all things” was clearly a preposterous and superstitious 
idea in nineteenth century Europe. Nevertheless, Nietzsche writes: 
Is it really necessary for us to take serious notice of this proposition? It is, 
and for three reasons. First, because it tells something about the primal 
origin of all things; second, because it does so in language devoid of 
image or fable, and finally, because contained in it, if only 
embryonically,13 is the thought, “all things are one.” (38)  
                                                 
     13. Note that the term for amniotic fluid in German is Fruchtwasser (“fruit water”). 
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For Nietzsche, the idea that all things are one is the “higher” idea that survives and it is 
Nietzsche’s emphatic embrace of this idea that gives my thesis its footing. It is not 
Thales’ superior skills as a scientist but this idea that makes Thales “the first Greek 
philosopher”: 
Thales did not overcome the low level of empiric insight prevalent in his 
time. What he did was to pass over its horizon…. What drove Thales to it 
was a metaphysical conviction which had its origin in a mystic intuition. 
We meet it in every philosophy . . . this proposition that ‘all things are 
one.’ (39) 
 
 Whether Aesop’s fables14 or Thales, it is philosophy, according to Nietzsche, not 
science (nor religious belief), that “legislates greatness.” It is philosophy that is “ever on 
the scent of those things which are most worth knowing, the great and the important 
insights,” insights that Nietzsche characterizes as “the unusual, the astonishing, the 
difficult and the divine” (43).   
 
Intuition & Intellect 
 To describe the advantage that philosophy has over science and reason Nietzsche 
uses the metaphor of a leap:  
Philosophy leaps ahead on tiny toeholds; hope and intuition lend wings to 
its feet. Calculating reason lumbers heavily behind, looking for better 
footholds, for reason too wants to reach that alluring goal which its divine 
comrade has long since reached. (40) 
 
Why does philosophical thinking arrive so much more quickly to its goal than thinking 
that calculates and measures? Is it simply a difference in measuring progress or is it a 
                                                 
     14. A former Greek slave, the fabulist Aesop is thought to have lived from 620 to 560 
BCE. 
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difference in kind?  Nietzsche answers that it is “the special strength of imagination…its 
lightning-quick seizure and illumination of analogies…an alien, illogical power,” that 
propels philosophical thought, a faculty that goes beyond what the senses and reason 
alone can tell us. This implies that philosophical thought is capable of an immediate 
grasp of things as they are, a grasp that is freed from the constraints of time as well as 
reason. This immediacy implies timelessness which in turn implies eternal, that is, 
without beginning and without end, like the Taoist circle referred to earlier.   
 What is being grasped is what Kant refers to as “the thing in itself” (Ding an 
sich); this is the Greek noúmenon, independent of a subjective, sense-mediated version of 
physical and temporal phenomena. For Kant, such an objective, unmediated reality is an 
unknowable impossibility. In contrast, Nietzsche argues that Kant’s Ding an sich is 
simply not available to logic (logos, that is language) alone (83). In ancient Greek, the 
root of noúmenon is nous, the mind, which pairs intellect with intuition. Nous is a faculty 
that is not dependent on interpretation by the senses nor on comprehension through the 
medium of language.  
 In Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks Nietzsche writes of Heraclitus that 
this philosopher’s great strength was “his extraordinary power to think intuitively” as 
opposed to relying on “logical combinations.” For Heraclitus, opposites exist together 
because in reality they are one thing: “Everything forever has its opposite along with it.” 
Intuitive thinking also embraces two things: the present, changing world of a multiplicity 
of experiences--the flowing stream we step into, changing with every moment—as well 
as the unchanging conditions that make any experience of this world possible: time and 
space.” These, according to Heraclitus, 
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may be perceived intuitively, even without a definite content, independent 
of all experience, purely in themselves. (52)  
 
This is the Greek nous: intellect and intuition. If we are indeed endowed with this 
pairing, this nous--this intuitive knowledge--then why not use it to to reach beyond the 
limits of time and space and culture to understand what we see and hear, what we know, 
what we live?  
 Contemporary critics of the source research methodology emerge, not 
surprisingly, in the fields that depend on it the most—Greek and Latin classics and 
Jewish and Christian religious studies. In her 2012 book on the legendary nature of the 
life of the a fifth century BCE fabulist (and possible fable himself…) named Aesop, 
Leslie Kurke offers a respectful yet full-throated critique of source research and begins 
her critique by pointing out that traditional Quellenforschung does not necessarily 
represent an impartial scholarship and does not always make its biases and motives plain. 
For instance, Kurke questions the assumption that, 
. . . influence or borrowing only ever goes one way—from the top down; 
from the products of elite culture to the popular….That is to say, this 
model recognizes no dialectic between the common culture and elite 
culture, or between oral traditions and textual instantiations. . . . (27) 
 
Instead, Kurke says, “we must imagine the Aesop texts we have as emerging from a 
constant, ongoing set of exchanges—a dialogue or conversation between different 
traditions taking place over a long period of time, of which our texts represent the 
sedimented residue” (27-28).15  
                                                 
     15. These are ideas linked to German philosopher (1900-2002) Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s “fusion of horizons” (Horizontverschmelzung) in the study of human 
understanding and interpretation; author of Truth and Method. 
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  The use of imagination and dialogue are elements that can infuse life into ancient 
texts and bring the researcher closer to their true source—the human imaginations and 
conversations from whence they originally spring. Kurke’s research on the anonymously 
sourced Life of Aesop uses imagination and, she acknowledges, even fantasy and “biased, 
interested reporting”—in other words everything at her disposal—to go beyond source 
research to present a compelling and credible picture of Greek popular culture in the time 
of Aesop, whether he existed as a man or as a legend. Within this dynamic context 
subsequent scholars may also go further, agreeing or disagreeing with Kurke’s 
conclusions.  
 On the one hand, we have Quellenforschung. On the other hand, we have 
everything else. This is why it is easier to do things with two hands and why, perhaps, we 
should endeavor to use every means available to pick up a spear. A conversation between 
ourselves and Nietzsche and ancient Greeks and Taoism does not seem an impossibility if 
we use eclectic means to develop “the ears to hear what is no longer here” as Hamilton 
writes in “Extemporalia” (26). 
 A conversation between ourselves and Nietzsche and pre-Socratic Greeks and 
Taoism does not seem an impossibility if we use a pluralistic, capacious criticism based 
on the technique of fruitful learning and on the principle of time as a continuum to apply 
intuition and imaginative writing that is truly disinterested, in order to mine any text or 
human thought for its inherent qualities and to consider the ideas that may “co-arise,” 
however incongruously across even great expanses of time and space. 
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Chapter II  
 
What is Tao?  
 
You don’t need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows. 
~ Bob Dylan, “Subterranean Homesick Blues” 
 
Those not aware of being Taoist may be most Taoist of all. 
~ Ming-Dao Deng, Scholar Warrior 246) 
 
 The term tao-chia distinguishes philosophical Taoism from religious Taoism (tao-
chiao), and is the original form of Taoist thought as expressed in the writings attributed to 
Laozi (ca 605 - 531 BCE) in the Tao te Ching and later in the Basic Writings or Zhuangzi 
attributed to Zhuangzi (370 – 287 BCE).16 The focus of tao-chia is based on inner 
wisdom accessed by observing the natural flow of events in the physical world, and unity 
with the Tao as a way of life.  
 
Cultural & Historical Context 
 The Norton Anthology of World Religions reports that Taoism has its roots in “a 
dense religious landscape” and is first recorded in Hindu texts written in Sanskrit dating 
back to 1500 BCE; the oral transmission of Taoist philosophy predates written texts by as 
much as 3500 years (Miles et al. 1473). Both Taoism and Confucianism17 are indigenous 
                                                 
     16. Note that the Norton Anthology states: “only in the hands of Western polemicists 
did these terms have the power to separate philosophy from religion” (1475). 
  
     17. Based on the teachings of Confucius (551-479 BCE) – philosopher, political 
figure, educator whose teachings addressed the ideal education and comportment of the 
individual in society; his influence in China is compared with that of Socrates in the 
West. After his death, the ethics and moral teachings of Confucius were written down by 
his students to become the Lun-yü, or Analects.  
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to China, while Buddhism18 developed in India from Hinduism evolving and adapting as 
it moved through Central Asia, China, and Japan.19 The first (known) written text of 
Taoism is Laozi’s Tao te Ching,20 which emerged out of its unwritten origins in response 
to Confucianism. There are many apocryphal stories in Taoist literature of meetings 
between Laozi and Confucius who were in fact contemporaries. One story from the Basic 
Writings of Zhuangzi captures the tone of Taoism’s response. In it Zhuangzi21 describes a 
Taoist named Dao Zhi scolding Confucius: 
The more you talk, the more nonsense you utter. You get your food 
without plowing and your clothes without weaving…. You arbitrarily 
decide what is right and wrong, leading princes astray and distracting 
scholars from their proper business. You recklessly set up filial piety and 
fraternal duty, and curry favor with the feudal princes, the wealthy, and 
the noble. Your offense is great; your crime is extremely heavy. Go home 
at once! (Deng, Lunar Tao 187) 
 
Both Laozi and later Zhuangzi represent the Taoist way as a carefree, even casual life of 
                                                 
 
     18. Based on the teachings of Buddha (566 BCE – 486 BCE). 
 
     19. In Japan, the influence of Taoism distinguishes Zen Buddhism from Indian 
Buddhism. 
 
     20. The Tao te Ching is attributed to the Chinese writer and philosopher Laozi and is 
often referred to simply by his name: Laozi. Both author and text are variously 
transliterated from the Chinese—Lao Tzu, Lao Tsu, Lao-tse etc. that translates as 
“Master Lao.” “Tao” is also sometimes spelled “Dao” and pronounced “dow” in any 
case.  
  
     21. Scholars cannot agree on whether the author Zhuangzi is an actual person or 
whether the Zhuangzi is a composite text assembled from many contributors in the 
character of the “witty philosopher” or “simply a person following Taoist philosophy of 
self-effacement and modesty.”  The Basic Writings of Zhuangzi offers “pseudo-
autobiographical sketches” of a vagabond everyman finding humor and lessons in 
everyday life” (Deng, Lunar Tao xxxi). Note that “vagabond” comes from the Latin 
vagary to wander, from vag, way (also weg in German) and means “way-bound” or 
“bonded to the way.” 
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nonconformity that looks to nature as an ultimate authority rather than to human rulers. 
Obviously, this message held particular appeal to non-conformists of all stripes--mystics, 
creatives, herbalists, recluses--anyone looking for an alternative to the strict hierarchy 
and rules of the sanctioned conventions of Chinese society advocated by Confucius at the 
time (Lunar Tao 398).  Deng observes that Taoism is the least popular of the spiritual 
traditions because it does not offer much to its followers—no heaven, no forgiveness, no 
ecstasy, no assurances, no comfort, no community, no social status:  
You have to be tough to follow Tao . . . rewards will come in slow and 
subtle ways. Tao offers only three things: sound health, a way through the 
bewilderment of life, and liberation from the fear of death. (365 Tao 57) 
 
The Norton tells us that “Daoism cannot claim the large numbers that other religions 
enjoy,” noting that it is a challenge to accurately estimate the number of Taoists or to 
decide who even counts as a Taoist: 
For much of its history…Daoism remained an invisible religion…The 
problem of who counts as a Daoist confounds…even today. (Miles et al. 
1494)  
 
I would suggest that there are many who “count” as Taoists who don’t know that they are 
(like Nietzsche, according to my thesis). While available to anyone, Taoist thought does 
not appeal to everyone. It remains an open yet secret source of knowledge that identifies 
the vicissitudes of human life as part of the pattern of nature, imbued with the cyclical 
movement that makes life possible and death inevitable, and that animates the cosmos. 
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What is Tao? 
 The Chinese word tao is translated as way or path. In the context of Taoist 
philosophical thought Tao refers to ‘way’ in the sense of a method of living life, in 
accord with a changing and, at the same time, eternal reality.22  The first written text for 
Taoism, the Tao te Ching, begins: 
The way that can be spoken 
[Tao k’o tao] 
is not the constant way  
[fei ch’ang tao] (Lau, Tao te Ching #1, 5; Wade-Giles transliteration of the 
Chinese)  
 
Taoist philosophy teaches that there is “a Way that all of nature and all human endeavors 
follow” and that every individual has a personal way as well (Deng, Lunar Tao xx).  In 
Chinese tao is represented by a pictograph composed of two images: 道, on the left a 
human figure takes a step forward and on the right a human head faces forward. The 
human meaning of Tao is simply movement forward and awareness of that movement. In 
the second line, Laozi challenges this simple interpretation of the tao that can be spoken 
by negating it with “not” (fei)23 and modifying it with “constant” (ch’ang).24   
 With these two lines, Laozi indicates that Tao is both knowable--as the ground at 
our feet is knowable--and unknowable; both nameless (nonbeing) and named (being).  
                                                 
     22. In ancient Greek, co-incidentally, metá (μετά) + hodós (ὁδός) translates as “along 
the path” implying a systematic pursuit of knowledge or some other inquiry. 
 
     23. The character for fei,非 is an ideogram of the two wings of a bird; wings that 
‘oppose’ each other but work together for flight. (Star 273) 
 
     24. Sometimes translated as “eternal,” “unchanging,” or “absolute.” 
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Within the depths of Tao, existence and nonexistence come together; no 
distinctions exist. Time becomes circular or even irrelevant. (Deng, 
Scholar Warrior 181) 
 
Taoists consider the knowable and the unknowable a pair that define one another, much 
as the two wings of a bird in the character for fei can only work as a pair. Deng 
acknowledges that the human mind cannot function in the nondualistic realm of the Tao: 
“We cannot see where there is no contrast” (181). We need to name things; we need 
black to see white and light to see dark. In other words, Tao is a constant and recurring 
mystery, a word that derives from the Greek myein: to shut or close the mouth and be 
mute.25 Thus, we might paraphrase the first two lines of the Tao te Ching this way: “to 
speak (read, write, perceive) of the Tao is to be mute (neither hear nor see the Tao).”   
 When Zen masters are asked, “What is Tao?” they demonstrate the inadequacy of 
logical reasoning by offering nonsense replies like, “A dragon singing in the ancient 
forest!” or “Go away!” or no reply at all. A paradox expressed as a question like this is 
called a “koan,” and is used both as a teaching aid in meditation to provoke 
enlightenment, and as a way to evaluate both masters and students. Frequently, the 
question is turned back on the questioner. The only reply worthy of the question “What is 
Tao?” is, traditionally, “Who are you?” Such a reply points out that the student already 
has, indeed, is the answer. Starting with this, the aim of Taoist thought is to develop a 
                                                 
     25. A student of German literature may be reminded of Friedrich Schiller’s poetic 
lament:       
   Why can’t the living spirit manifest itself to the spirit? 
 Warum kann der lebendige Geist dem Geist nicht erscheinen? 
 If the soul speaks, alas, it is no longer the soul that speaks. 
 Spricht die Seele, so spricht ach! schon die Seele nicht mehr. 
           [Schiller, “Sprache” Tabulae Votivae Xenien, 1797] (Bertram 300 Fn.58) 
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personal philosophy of self-knowledge and self-reliance and then to learn to live by 
living. 
 
Wu wei 
 A central concept of Taoist thought is wu wei, pairing action and non-action. 
Laozi #37 sums up this concept: Tao does not act, yet there is nothing that it does not do. 
Action without doing does not mean refraining from action but acting as nature acts, 
without intellectual intent or desire (Deng, Lunar Tao 215). Nature and the universe do 
not “act” in the sense of being motivated, intentional, or intellectual nevertheless action 
inevitably results from their existence. Wu wei characterizes the movement of Tao and 
serves as a model for human endeavor. It is not a prescription for thoughtlessness, 
ignorance, or selfishness but the result of understanding, insight, and skill. Deng likens 
wu wei to the effortlessly correct, spontaneous creative action of a fully-developed artist 
or musician who has mastered their craft (Scholar Warrior 186).  
 A story from Zhuangzi is illustrative: an old Taoist sage sits in the sun with his 
long freshly washed hair flowing over his shoulders; his students ask him what he is 
doing and how they can help him. The sage replies: ‘What is there that needs to be done? 
My hair is being dried by the sun, and I am resting at the origin of all things.’ This is the 
Taoist concept of wu wei: even when nothing is done, nothing is left undone; the 
dichotomy between being and doing, something and nothing, is resolved.  
 “Give up learning,” Laozi #20 advises,26 meaning: do not allow education to 
“become the tool of selfish egotism;” do not use knowledge to “take advantage of 
                                                 
     26. Various translations. 
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others;” do not venerate the old simply because they are old, but “value wisdom” (187). 
The aim of a Taoist life, is to generate “life and not misery for others” almost 
unconsciously. Deng offers the example of heaven and earth that “do not think about 
creating the weather, the seasons, and the cycles of growing” but merely revolve 
“according to their nature… the rest is generated without any thought or work on their 
part” (Deng, 365 Tao 68).   
When [Taoists] say to eliminate benevolence, righteousness, and morality, 
they mean that we should not adhere to the empty and phony forms of 
these things [but] to enter into a creative state in which actions are deeply 
intuitive and correct. This ‘correctness’ is the correctness of Nature. 
(Deng, Scholar Warrior 187) 
 
Does a similar intuition about the correctness of spontaneous action in harmony with the 
essence of human and cosmic creativity inspire Nietzsche and drive his passionate 
demand for a “transvaluation of all values” (AC #13, 35)?  In the First Proposition of his 
“Decree Against Christianity” he will write that “every form of anti-nature is depraved” 
(Shapiro 212).27  
 
Inherency 
 In the same way that Buddhism teaches that “Buddha nature” is inherent in every 
being, knowledge of Tao—the forces and patterns found in nature and the cosmos--is 
inherent in humanity. Along with the knowledge and awareness gained by experience of 
the outer physical universe (phenomena) and the inner universe of the self (noumena), is 
                                                 
 
     27. The Antichrist (1888) is the last book Nietzsche writes before his breakdown, 
published in 1895. Nietzsche’s Gesetz Wider Christentum (“Decree against Christianity”) 
is a section added by Nietzsche but according to Shapiro removed by his literary 
executors (212) and customarily excluded from Anglophone translations (Conway 220).  
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an inherent awareness of Tao--it may never become conscious but it is there--the 
overarching reality behind everything: motion, flow, stasis, and change 
 Modern Taoists consider that every aspect of the universe exists within the 
purview of Tao—the inner and outer life of human society and individual life forms as 
well as cyberspace and dark matter—are all subject to the same patterns and laws. The 
inherent process of growing awareness may be compared to natural science, what the 
Greeks call physis. This is the uniquely human attempt to capture and to understand both 
the laws of nature and the ineffable. “Heraclitus first indicated that knowledge of the soul 
was relevant to knowledge of the structure of the cosmos” Kirk & Raven write in The 
Presocratic Philosophers (8). 
 The inherency of wisdom and enlightenment, what the Sufi mystic Rumi calls 
“the essential intellect in all existence” (Barks 56), is the Taoist view. Individual 
identity—from one’s mental and biological make-up to the conditions and realities of 
one’s everyday life—shares the same properties, patterns and behaviors found on the 
microcosmic level of atoms, molecules, and cells as on the cosmic levels of the universe. 
In other words, the individual cannot be understood apart from the whole and the whole 
cannot be understood apart from the individual. These patterns are, in effect, the natural 
order of things and the Chinese word for this kind order is li. There is another word, tsu 
that refers the order of things as they are spoken or written down; tsu might be said to be 
roughly equivalent to logos, the logic required to describe the natural order of things. Tsu 
is a quality unique to humans. 
 Laozi is said to have written the Tao te Ching in verse because “knowledge of 
Tao lodges in the same part of the mind as poetry” (Deng, 365 Tao 63). There is “a vast 
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difference between the words of scholars and the words of a practitioner, just as the 
words of academics differ from the words of poets” (63). Nietzsche makes a very similar 
observation speaking of early Presocratics in PTAG: 
What verse is for the poet, dialectical thinking is for the philosopher. He 
grasps for it in order to get hold of his own enchantment, in order to 
perpetuate it. And just as for the dramatist words and verse are but the 
stammering of an alien tongue, needed to tell what he has seen and lived, 
what he could utter directly only through music or gesture, just so every 
profound philosophic intuition expressed through dialectic and through 
scientific reflection is the only means for the philosopher to communicate 
what he has seen. But it is a sad means; basically a metaphoric and 
entirely unfaithful translation into a totally different sphere and speech. 
Thus Thales had seen the unity of all that is, but when he went to 
communicate it, he found himself talking about water! (44-45) 
 
Making a similar point, Richard Wilhelm28 writes in his 1925 Commentary on the Tao te 
Ching:  
One cannot gain an understanding of Lao Zi’s thought by a process of 
abstraction; instead, a primal view from one’s inner depths will produce 
these images for oneself. These images or forms are non-corporeal, not 
spatial. They are like fleeting images passing over the smooth surface of a 
mirror. These ‘images of things’ are the seeds of reality. Just as the acorn 
contains the oak, ungraspable, invisible and yet completely distinct as an 
entelechy, so the ‘things of reality are contained in these seed-images. (72-
73)29 
                                                 
     28. Richard Wilhelm (1873 – 1930) Swiss sinologist who translated the Tao te Ching 
into German in 1910. In 1924 Wilhelm also translated and wrote extensively on the 
classic Chinese text of divination and moral decision-making, the I Ching (“Book of 
Changes”) from the Zhou Period 1000–750 BCE, informed by both Taoism and 
Confucianism.  
 
     29. Entelechy: the realization of potential; the supposed vital principle that guides the 
development and functioning of an organism or other system or organization. From the 
Greek entelḗs: complete, finished, perfect; télos: end, fruition, accomplishment; and ékhō: 
to have. Note the similarity to Anaxagoras who theorizes at roughly around the same time 
a similar origin to the cosmos: void followed by spontaneous movement leading to the 
creation of all things where “all Things were present in the Whole that contains the 
“seeds infinite in number” of “all Things” (Freeman & Diels, Ancilla 59:4 83). Wilhelm 
uses very similar language here. 
 
26 
 
 
 
 
Taoist philosophy has its origins in an agrarian perspective on the world based on the 
cycles of night and day and of seasons, forging a philosophy based on experience that 
combines pragmatism and mysticism. Simply put, Taoism looks to the physical, 
phenomenal world for answers to spiritual, noumenal questions and vice versa: “The 
spirit is wrapped in reason and reason is wrapped in spirit” (Deng, Lunar Tao 31). 
 
Qi 
 A Taoist relationship to the divine is one in which there is no division and in 
Taoism the divine30 is not an external entity or an entity at all but a pervasive life force 
called qi31.  Qi is also the Chinese word for breath, which generates energy in everything 
that lives and is the primary indication of life. If we mean to study life, therefore, it 
makes sense to study the breath (Deng, Everyday Tao 14). The most ancient character in 
Chinese for qi is three horizontal lines, an image depicting the mist that rises from the 
warm earth into the cool atmosphere or the vapor of exhalation of a living being on a cold 
day. “As we breathe, so too does the universe breathe” (Deng, 365 Tao 351). We should 
note here that in Latin the word for “breath” has the same derivation as the word for 
“spirit”: spiritus. The very act of breathing, being alive, is itself a spiritual act. 
                                                 
     30. Deities exist in Taoism but they represent “the enormous diversity of existence” 
and embody virtues and values viewed as “a necessary part of human experience.” These 
include wisdom, compassion, humor, and patience but do not exclude the aggressive and 
warlike qualities that are also a part of life. The function of prayer is not to seek outside 
help, but to help the seeker discover and develop their own capacity to use these qualities 
(Deng, Lunar Tao 35). 
 
     31. Sometimes spelled chi and pronounced “kee.” 
 
27 
 
 
 
 In Taoist meditation, the exchange of breath with the outside makes concrete the 
notion that there is no separation between the individual and the world. A similar lack of 
separation between the individual and the world exists when sound waves enter an 
individual’s ear and affects the emotions or a scent enters the nose or mouth and triggers 
a memory. Taoists frequently point to fish in the water to illustrate this undivided 
relationship saying that Tao is knowable to an individual as water is knowable to a fish. 
Each individual’s tao belongs to that individual just as the water passing through a fish’s 
gills belongs to that fish, until it returns to its universal nature in an ongoing and constant 
exchange of life force and energy. 
 Taoist, Buddhist, and the Hindu Yogic traditions all incorporate conscious, 
unforced breathing, as well as guided breathing techniques as a way to connect the spirit 
to the mind and the mind to the body. Breathing is physical and it is spiritual–everything 
inside a living being changes when a breath is taken. Contemplating the breath in 
meditation (what is a breath but itself a tiny representation of void?) puts an individual in 
harmony with the physical world that also breathes.32 Meditation is both an act and a 
metaphor for the marriage of inner and outer, conscious and unconscious. It is a way for 
the human mind, filled with its own countless creations,33 to periodically empty itself. 
“The more subtle truth,” Deng writes, is that the world changes the individual as much as 
the individual changes the world and meditating on this exchange increases awareness 
that goes beyond individuality to the true nature of that relationship (Lunar Tao 27). 
                                                 
     32. See Appendix Chapter II for Neijing tu (“World in the Body”) illustration.  
 
     33. What Deng refers to as being “lost in the vastness of our own uncharted minds” 
(365 Tao 101). 
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When the wind blows or waves roll through the ocean, a Taoist is reminded of how the 
world breathes as one and how connected human existence is to this universal breath.  
 
Chaos & Creative Void 
 Where did everything come from, according to Taoist thought? Curiosity about 
the origin of the universe is commonly satisfied with creation myths and legends but 
prehistoric Taoists, like modern physicists34 and the pre-Socratic Greeks, are not satisfied 
with these stories. In Tao te Ching #25, Laozi places Tao in the context of the beginning 
of the universe:  
There was something chaotic yet complete here  
  before heaven and earth were born.  
How silent and still it was, how singular and unaltered,  
  turning without stop.  
Perhaps it was the mother of all under heaven.  
I do not know its name,  
  but it must be given a word, call it Tao.  
(Deng trans. Lunar Tao 330, emphasis added) 
 
The word chaos, from Greek khaos (Χάος) means gaping void or chasm. According to 
the poet Hesiod,35 chaos was the first thing to exist. Modern physicists use the term to 
refer to the formless matter out of which the universe is thought to have been formed. 
The Norton Anthology of World Religions uses similar language: 
The Dao referred to a unified universal principle preceding the origin of 
the universe which set into motion the process of creation and was the 
                                                 
     34. Arguably, quantum physics is an attempt to discover what Taoists began to intuit 
five thousand years ago.  
 
     35. Hesiod was active circa 750 and 650 BCE around the same time as Homer. He is 
credited with works including the Theogony, a cosmological work describing the origins 
and genealogy of the gods, and Works and Days, on the subjects of farming, morality and 
country life. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hesiod  
 
29 
 
 
 
cause of its enduring transformation. The Dao is the unchanging reality 
behind a chaotic and ever-shifting plurality of transformations. (Miles 
1483) 
 
As with Tao, there is clearly a struggle to define the nothingness that precedes everything 
else, “Void is not something, but there is void” James Porter writes in Nietzsche and the 
Philology of the Future (86). Yet the concept of the creative potential of emptiness is 
central to Taoist philosophy as well as in Nietzsche. In Taoism, this void is Tao and the 
mother of all things: 
Tao gave birth to One, 
One gave birth to Two, 
Two gave birth to Three, 
Three gave birth to all the myriad36 things. 
 
All the myriad things carry the Yin on their backs and 
   hold the Yang in their embrace, 
Deriving their vital harmony from the proper blending 
   of the two vital Breaths. (Wu, Tao Teh Ching #42 87)37 
 
Deng writes that Taoists claim “that the source of all things is an even greater 
emptiness…. Nothing precedes nothingness, so it is logically the beginning point” 
(Scholar Warrior 183). This is what the Greeks will call apeiron. 
 The iconic symbol for Taoist philosophy is the taijitu, a closed circle representing 
the limitless potential of Tao before duality, encompassing two contrasting, interlocking 
spirals, yin and yang (“dark-bright”) each containing the seed of its opposite.38   
                                                 
     36. The word “myriad” comes from the Greek murioi meaning 10,000, a figure 
frequently used in Taoist texts to denote innumerable or endless. 
 
     37. Richard Wilhelm’s translation of the end of this verse: “All things have darkness 
at their back and strive towards the light and the flowing power gives them harmony.” 
(Wilhelm 46) 
     38.  - such a diagram was first introduced by Song Dynasty philosopher Zhou Dunyi 
(1017–1073). See Appendix Chapter II for illustration. 
30 
 
 
 
Yin and yang can be light and dark, hard and soft, outer and inner, male 
and female, hot and cold, positive and negative…. Neither could exist 
without the other: they define each other….. The entire universe, with its 
constant and dynamic motion, is an ongoing play between yin and yang. 
Since the universe is infinite and has no fixed points, there is no absolute 
point of view…only an observer whose observations must forever be 
considered subjective. (189) 
 
Yin-yang symbolizes the spontaneous and continuous flow of the movement of opposites 
becoming. For Taoists, balance is never achieved for long, as that would be stasis and 
“Taoists do not observe stasis anywhere in the universe” (190). 
 The Taoist premise is that everything in the universe comes out of nothing, the 
void preceding the creation of the cosmos. Void, having no beginning and no end, is what 
each individual and the universe itself will return to in a cycle that is, in effect, endless. A 
creative void creates and that which is created eventually returns to its source, the void. 
The idea of creative void is commonly represented by a large, empty circle, like the 
ensō39 of Zen Buddhism or (arguably) “First Day of Creation” from the Nuremberg 
Chronicle40 a universal image of wholeness as well as nihility. The circle is a 
multipurpose visual metaphor for the life cycle, for timelessness, for the bowl of the sky, 
the shape of the earth, the sun, the four directions, and the whirling wind--the everyday 
things that humanity from its earliest beginnings  experiences, observes, and periodically 
is compelled to think and speak about.  
                                                 
     39. In Zen Buddhism, an ensō is a circle that is hand-drawn in one or two uninhibited 
brushstrokes to express a moment when the mind is free to let the body create. See 
Appendix Chapter II for illustration. 
     40. See Appendix Chapter II for illustrations. 
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 Because of their common origin, it follows that everything in the universe is 
related, and the common material of cosmic kindred are the atoms of their physical 
material, the patterns of their design and behavior, and the energy and character of their 
movement. Movement originates in the void and this movement results in material 
creation, decay, and eventual disintegration back to the unknowable, pre-creative void 
from which everything emerges in a timeless cycle.  In the West, “void” often assumes a 
negative, even a menacing, existential connotation: empty, lacking, and lifeless. Arthur 
Schopenhauer’s response to the emptiness of the void was to conclude that life is 
meaningless suffering and the only way to avoid it (so to speak) is to deny life through 
desirelessness. This describes nihilism. Nietzsche will acknowledge the fearsomeness of 
khaos but is himself characteristically fearless in exploring the enormous implications of 
its potential. He will recognize that not everyone in his own time and culture will be up to 
redefining the value and meaning of life in the face of it (the void). He writes in Beyond 
Good and Evil: 
Whoever fights with monsters should see to it that he does not become one 
himself. And when you stare for a long time into an abyss, the abyss stares 
back at you.  (Norman, BGE 4:146 69)  
 
 In striking contrast to this dark perspective, Taoists are apt to compare the void to 
a fertile valley, open to the accumulation of water and sun and hospitable to life; offering 
not only a broad view but also a returning echo of our own existence. Taoists, in other 
words, find the idea of the void a comforting and constant companion, similar to the 
comfort that derives from the awareness of being a part of nature. The Taoist embrace of 
a creative void is apparent in many examples of positive emptiness in everyday life: the 
womb where life begins, the human chest where the heart beats, or the hollow base of a 
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living tree. This kind of emptiness is a tangible part of all reality and since there is “no 
separation between void and phenomena,” Taoists are encouraged to “delight in life but 
never see more than void” (Deng, 365 Tao 156).  
 Rather than cautioning us about the effects of staring into the void, as Nietzsche 
does, Taoism suggests:  
Be void contemplating void … to be void is the only true mode of 
meditation…void is not the object of meditation—to pair meditator and 
object creates a dualistic relationship that leads one astray. In meditation 
we are searching for unity. The only true meditation is one that does not 
put us into a relationship of viewer and object. Any object, no matter how 
holy, reinforces the illusion that there is a reality outside of ourselves…the 
true interior view [is that] there is no difference between our inner and 
outer realities…nothing to contemplate, nothing to think about. (221)  
  
In Taoist meditation, the true interior view is the realization that our sense of identity is 
only the result of dualistic thinking. An awareness of the void is to understand that there 
is really nothing to contemplate, we are the void. This nondualistic outlook leads to an 
interpretation of divinity that includes all of existence:  
If there were an absolute god, there could not be anything separate from 
god. Everything is god. We are also god but fail to realize this. Why? 
Because we look for god outside of ourselves. We make the mistake of 
taking ourselves as the viewer and then seek god as the object of our 
examinations. Unfortunately, everything we perceive is tainted by our 
subjectivity, and anything that we define as god “out there” cannot be god 
because it is not absolute. All you’ve found is something that exists in 
relation to your perceptions. (211) 
 
While Deng is writing about a philosophy with roots in an ancient Chinese past, the 
concepts of duality, subjectivity, and perspectivism evoke the themes and issues in this 
thesis that we will explore further in subsequent chapters.  
 Taoists, true to their receptive, skeptical, inquiring style (and not unlike the 
Presocratic Greeks) borrow freely from any source if it advances their inner development 
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and life skills. It is clear that many have borrowed from Taoism in turn. Geographically, 
the Presocratic Greeks were extremely well-placed to be exposed to all the best ideas 
originating both to the East and West of them and well-disposed to avail themselves of 
those ideas. 
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Chapter III 
 
The Presocratics 
 
It may not be logical, but it certainly is human… 
~ Nietzsche (PTAG 46) 
 
 Between the sixth and fifth centuries BCE, Greek scientist philosophers41 began 
to emerge in the small cities and towns clustered around the Mediterranean from the 
southern Ionian coast of Asia Minor (Miletus, Ephesus, Clazomenae) to the megálē hellás 
(“greater Greece”) of Greek colonies in Southern Italy and Sicily (Elea and Acragas).  
 Open to trade and ideas from the ancient civilized world from the Near East to the 
Far East,42 the Presocratics are first generation of Greeks to separate their intellectual and 
political lives from their religious beliefs and practices; they also freely personalize the 
ideas of others and absorb them into Greek culture.  “It has been pointed out assiduously 
how much the Greeks were able to find and learn abroad in the Orient and it is doubtless 
                                                 
     41. Aristotle called the pre-Socratics physikoi ("physicists", after physis, "nature") 
because they sought natural explanations for phenomena, as opposed to the earlier 
theologoi (theologians), whose philosophical basis was supernatural. Curd, Patricia, 
"Presocratic Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (editor). 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/presocratics .  
 
     42. Note that these terms date from British colonial times and are coined from a 
Western perspective. “Near East” and “Middle East” have come to overlap in modern 
times and refer geographically to southwest Asia: Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Jordan, 
Saudi Arabia and other nations of the Arabian Peninsula, including ancient Mesopotamia, 
a word that in ancient Greek means “between rivers” referring to the Tigris and the 
Euphrates or modern-day Iraq. “Far East” and “Orient” refer to the Asian continent and 
subcontinent. 
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true that they picked up much there,” Nietzsche writes, “…the very reason they got so far 
is that they knew how to pick up the spear and throw it onward from the point where 
others had left it” (PTAG 29-30).    
 The Presocratics are the key to the connection between Nietzsche and Taoist 
thought. We must try to understand them as Nietzsche did in order to reveal his 
connection to Taoist thought. In Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, Nietzsche 
credits the physikoi with being the first to realize and acknowledge that there is a 
correlation between nature and the mind of man and to consider this correlation in 
scientific and human terms. In PTAG he reflects on Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, 
Parmenides, and Anaxagoras in turn; with particular attention to what he calls “the 
personal element” (25). The key word here is ‘personal.’ It is the shared understanding of 
Nietzsche, the Presocratics, and Taoist thought that philosophy is personal; a philosophy 
that is purely intellectual and not lived, is divorced from life itself and has little 
relevance. Since life itself is part of the greater cosmos, the laws that govern nature 
(physis) inevitably apply—down to the smallest units of life and matter; and including 
actions, thought, and intuition. 
 In Philology of the Future Porter rests his view of Nietzsche on the premise that 
the Presocratics remained constant “frames of reference…from 1867 down to his last 
jottings in 1889” (20). It is these ancient philosophers that Nietzsche feels closest to in 
temperament and philosophy and who ground him in “the inescapability of metaphysical 
thinking” (21) throughout his lifetime. It is the Presocratics, I believe, who also reveal to 
Nietzsche, from the beginning of his intellectual life, the inherent fallacy of dualistic 
thinking in the subject-object problem: “It is absolutely impossible for a subject to see or 
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have insight into something while leaving itself out of the picture, so impossible that 
knowing and being are the most opposite of all spheres” (PTAG 83). Nietzsche calls 
knowing and being ‘opposites’ with a full awareness that opposites are always two halves 
of a whole with a tendency to lead one to the other and back again. This nondualistic 
stance is the Greek in Nietzsche, and the Taoist as well. 
 The best and closest of friends are also often the sharpest observers of their 
companions’ true natures and intentions. In Nietzsche’s early lectures at Basel he points 
out that “the Greeks borrowed whatever they needed from the Orient” and elaborates, 
“That the Greeks became more serious and profound did not come from within: for their 
true talent was, as Homer shows, ordering, making beautiful and more superficial, 
playing and eu skolakein”43 (Brobjer 11). Brobjer adds that “Most about Eastern thought 
can be found in two lecture series that [Nietzsche] gave during the winter semester of 
1875/76, Der Gottesdienst der Griechen  and Geschichte der grieschischen Litteratur 
III”44  and cites from Nietzsche’s notes: 
In the 6th century [BCE] came another great wave of Asian influence, the 
seeds of tragedy, philosophy and science came along with it…. During the 
6th and 5th centuries [BCE] in faraway India the feeling of the seriousness 
of life became overpowering…. The last waves of this profound 
movement reached Greek soil. (Brobjer 11; fn45: KGW II.5, 310f) 
 
The ‘seriousness of life’ is also a Greek concern. In his 1886 preface to the second 
edition of The Gay Science (Die fröhliche Wissenschaft), Nietzsche writes: “Those 
                                                 
     43. Eu skolakein denotes people who are good at being leisurely in the sense of having 
the leisure to study and contemplate. John Hamilton notes: “Scholē essentially means 
leisure or rest while ascholia is the common word for business” [in the sense of busy-
ness]. Nietzsche’s remark, therefore, is both a criticism and a back-handed compliment.   
 
     44. Respectively: “How the Greeks Worship” and “History of Greek literature, 
Lecture 3” – Trans. Deborah Theodore. 
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Greeks were superficial—from profundity!” (8). What Nietzsche refers to in 1876 as 
“superficial,” H.D.F. Kitto elucidates in The Greeks as simplicity, “a permanent feature 
of Greek thought”:  
. . . the universe, both the physical and moral universe must be not only 
rational, and therefore knowable, but also simple; the apparent multiplicity 
of physical things is only superficial . . . the Greek dramatist thinks in 
precisely the same way: ‘Don’t bother about the apparent variety and 
richness of life: get down to the simple truth.’ (179) 
 
 Across the ages, this is the ancient Greeks’ response to accusations of excessive 
Greek cheerfulness and apparent superficiality: that what is truly and fatally superficial is 
the inability to perceive the unity of all things. “The most typical feature of the Greek 
mind,” Kitto writes, “is a sense of wholeness of things” and he cites Homer who “for all 
his love of the particular detail and the individual character, yet fixes it firmly into a 
universal frame; [in the way that] so many Greeks are several things at once” (169). Kitto 
illustrates Greek mind-body-moral wholeness in a line from Homer’s Iliad describing 
Achilles’ mental and emotional state as he is poised to kill a man: “His heart within his 
shaggy breast was torn, whether he should…slay Atreus’ son, or put away his wrath.” It 
is typical of Homeric verse, Kitto writes, to refer simultaneously to the inner and the 
outer man in a line that “sees the whole man at once” (172).45 
 
Thales of Miletus (625-546 BCE) 
 Nietzsche traces the unifying theme of wholeness back to Thales of Miletus, 
whom we have discussed in the Introduction. Before Thales and the other Milesian 
                                                 
     45. See Appendix Chapter III Aóristos: the grammar of Greek wholeness. 
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philosophers,  
Greeks believed only in the reality of men and gods, looking upon all of 
nature as but a disguise, a masquerade . . . Man for them was the truth and 
the core of all things; everything else was but semblance and the play of 
illusion. (PTAG 41) 
  
It is Thales, the “first philosopher” who “suddenly” looks beyond man, his 
anthropomorphic gods, and his mythological fables to say: “‘Not man, but water is the 
reality of all things.’ He begins to believe in nature,46 by believing at least in water” 
writes Nietzsche (42). 
 Nietzsche’s own intuition tells him the same thing: that the only way to account 
for the seamless, interlocking patterns of the natural physical world is a unifying 
principle, an arkhe.47 What led Thales to this insight was, Nietzsche writes, “a 
metaphysical conviction which had its origin in a mystic intuition. We meet it in every 
philosophy…this proposition that ‘all things are one’” (39). 
 
Anaximander of Miletus (610-547 BCE) 
 Much is attributed to Anaximander but very little remains. What we know of him 
comes from the testimony of others. Reporting on a fragment that Theophrastus was said 
to have seen,48 Simplicius records that Anaximander was “the first to call the substratum 
of opposites, arkhe” (Kirk & Raven 108), which implies that in the beginning there was 
                                                 
     46. In Greek, physis. 
 
     47. arkhe (ἀρχή): the Greek word for ‘beginning,’ both in a temporal sense and in the 
sense of a first principle or cause” (Warren 3). 
 
     48. See Chapter I, footnote 12. 
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only wholeness giving rise to diversity in the form of opposing forces or elements. 
Simplicius records that Anaximander is also the first to use the term apeiron (the 
boundless) to describe “the origin and nature from which come all the heavens and all the 
cosmoses within them” (Warren 29). Apeiron is formed from the negating prefix: a- and 
peirata: end, limit, boundary. By implication, this is to say that this beginning is 
unknowable since something without limits cannot be known; to know it would be to 
impose limits (peirata) for the sake of knowing it. We find a clear echo here of Laozi #1, 
“The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao” and of Schiller (“The soul 
speaks…”).49 
 Anaximander and his interpreters and translators grapple with the same mute 
mystery as Taoist sages not so far away to the East, along the so-called “silk routes”50 
also characterize the indescribable beginning of the cosmos as the boundless and 
indefinite Tao, the ultimate source of all things, which are numberless.   
 Of the five brief first-hand fragments that do survive from Anaximander himself 
three are remarkable for their singularity. The first one describes the origin of the 
universe in terms of morality—justice and injustice, necessity and reparation: 
12:1: The Non-Limited is the original material of existing things; further, 
the source from which existing things derive their existence is also that to 
which they return at their destruction, according to necessity; for they give 
justice and make reparation to one another for their injustice, according to 
the arrangement of Time. (Freeman & Diels 19) 
 
In PTAG, Nietzsche’s translates this fragment himself from the Greek: 
                                                 
     49. See Chapter II, footnote 25. 
 
    50. Formerly known as the Persian Royal Road established during the Achaemenid 
Empire (500-330 BCE) and dubbed Seidenstrassen by the geographer and traveler F. von 
Richthofen in 1877 (Joshua J. Mark, “Silk Road,” Ancient History Encyclopedia, last 
modified March 28, 2014, http://www.ancient.eu  
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Where the source of things is, to that place they must also pass away, 
(according to necessity for they must pay penance and be judged for their 
injustices,) in accordance with the ordinance of time.’ (45)51  
 
Because it mentions justice and refers to judgment, Richard McKirahan suggests that this 
fragment of Anaximander’s “contains the beginning of the idea of a law of nature which 
operates uniformly and impersonally and also holds inevitably (‘according to necessity’): 
things not only do happen in accordance with this law, they must (McKirahan 44). Or do 
Anaximander’s fragments suggest rather that the injustice of man’s very mortality is the 
reason for the injustices he both suffers and commits in his life?52 
 Nietzsche is sympathetic to Anaximander’s dilemma: “the moral value of 
existence” on the one hand, and the seemingly ‘unjust’ inevitability of death on the other.  
It may not be logical, but it certainly is human, to view now, together with 
Anaximander, all coming-to-be as though it were an illegitimate 
emancipation from eternal being, a wrong for which destruction is the only 
penance. Everything that has ever come-to-be again passes away, whether 
we think of human life or of water or of hot and cold. (PTAG 46)  
 
Men cannot accept death, Nietzsche suggests, because dying requires justifying ones 
existence; Anaximander’s moralistic response to death is an escape “into a metaphysical 
fortress” (48).  If the question is: ‘What is your existence worth? And if it is worthless, 
why are you here?’ Anaximander’s reply is that man is unworthy of existence; he can 
                                                 
     51. In tao-chia movement from the source (life) and back (death) is called Return, or 
the “Tao Axiom.” See Appendix Chapter II: Laozi #14.  
 
     52. Nietzsche cites Arthur Schopenhauer’s Parerga and Paralipomena “Additional 
Remarks on the Doctrine of the Suffering of the World”) in this passage: “‘We do 
penance for having been born, first by living and then by dying’” and refers to him as “‘a 
man who has heard ‘upon the heights of Indian’s clear air’ the holy word of the moral 
value of existence—such a man will find it difficult to keep from indulging in a highly 
anthropomorphic metaphor. He will extract that melancholy doctrine from its application 
to human life and project it unto the general quality of all existence” (PTAG 46).  
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only expiate the guilt of his unworthiness by ceasing to exist. (49)   
 Nietzsche’s contention with Anaximander on the topic of death becomes clearer if 
we consider Taoist thought, where the problem of death is a man-made problem: only 
man laments his own death, in advance. Therefore, this is a thinking problem, like 
narcissism or greed or envy. Only man thinks: if it is inevitable that I should die then why 
am I alive? Only man thinks in terms of individual mortality. Reproduction, food, 
security, all come down to individual survival. This is out of balance with nature. Other 
creatures living in nature do not have the same interest in death that man does. If there is 
any comfort to be found in the idea of dying, Taoism teaches, man must find it in the idea 
of returning to the creative void from which he came, or not at all. The point of Tao is to 
live in accordance with nature, not to seek an afterlife other than the cycle of life. For 
Taoists death is a natural part of life, a return to the source of life. 
 Ultimately, like Thales, Anaximander redeems himself from his seemingly 
narrow moralistic stance on death as penance for existence by not wavering on arkhe: 
that the original material of everything that exists is unlimited and that while individual 
lives may cease “no end can be envisaged from the womb of the ‘indefinite’” (PTAG 50). 
Neither Nietzsche nor a Taoist would argue with that. 
 
Heraclitus of Ephesus (584-484 BCE) 
 In Ecce Homo,53 Nietzsche writes that he feels “altogether warmer and better than 
anywhere else…in the vicinity of Heraclitus” (EH “The Birth of Tragedy” 51). Greg 
                                                 
     53. Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is--a hybrid ‘autobibliography’ of 
Nietzsche’s life and works written between his birthday on October 15 and November 4, 
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Whitlock, who translated and introduced Nietzsche’s 1869 to 1876 lecture series on the 
Presocratics at the University of Basel refers to Heraclitus as the “pre-Platonic Nietzsche” 
(Whitlock xxxvii). If the Presocratics (or pre-Platonics)54 are the key to the connection 
between Nietzsche and Tao, Heraclitus is the key turning in the lock. It is Heraclitus who 
truly breaks free of dualistic thinking and would be supremely comfortable with Taoist 
ideas about relative truth and absolute truth. Relative truth, Taoists say, is reached by 
means of reason—observation, science, and discussion (language!). The absolute truth, 
however, can only be reached by mystical perception (Deng, Lunar Tao 31).  
 “Heraclitus’ regal possession is his extraordinary power to think intuitively,” 
Nietzsche tells us, describing intuitive thinking this way:  
Intuitive thinking embraces two things: one, the present many-colored and 
changing world that crowds in upon us in all our experiences, and two, the 
conditions which alone make any experience of this world possible: time 
and space. For they may be perceived intuitively, even without a definite 
content, independent of all experience, purely in themselves. (PTAG 52) 
 
Heraclitus accepts the coexistence of a (relative) physical world of the senses and a 
(absolute) metaphysical world and does not distinguish between them, “I see nothing 
other than becoming” he declares and “Everything forever has its opposite along with it.” 
For this position, Aristotle will later condemn him for sinning against “the law of 
contradiction” (52).   
 For Taoists too, these so-called opposites--the relative truth and the absolute truth-
                                                 
1888, shortly before his breakdown in 1889; it was published posthumously in 1908 
(1979, xviii).  
 
     54. Whitlock discusses the reasons for the disparity in the terms “pre-Platonic” and 
“pre-Socratic” in his preface to Pre-Platonic Philosophers (Nietzsche 2006 xiv-xix). 
Since PTAG ends before Nietzsche discusses either Socrates or Plato, this thesis stays 
with ‘Presocratics.’ 
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-are offspring of the same source, Tao, and emerge from it together. The relative truth is 
what we see before us, everyday life. The phenomena of everyday life are an echo, if one 
can but hear it, of an absolute truth: that every being is on a path that leads continually 
between nothing to something and back again. Through Nietzsche we can see that some 
Presocratics, like Taoists, perceive the everyday phenomenal world not in opposition to 
the metaphysical world but as a link to it, translated into a language the senses can 
comprehend. 
 In contrast to Anaximander’s judgment of unworthy lives and perpetual 
atonement, Nietzsche writes that Heraclitus intuitively finds “wonderful order, regularity 
and certainty” in the constant change of coming-to-be and passing away (71). In this 
sense, one might say that Heraclitus is inherently Taoist. Irreverent, proud, contrary, and 
yet profoundly serious,55 Heraclitus  walks “straight at that mystic night” (50) that 
shrouds Anaximander’s “problem of becoming,” and illuminates it with the “lawful 
order” and unity of opposites:  
[Heraclitus] no longer distinguished a physical world from a metaphysical 
one, a realm of definite qualities from an undefinable ‘indefinite.’ And 
after this first step, nothing could hold him back from a far bolder 
negation: he altogether denied being… Heraclitus proclaimed: ‘I see 
nothing other than becoming…be not deceived….  You use names for 
things as though they rigidly, persistently endured; yet even the stream 
into which you step a second time is not the one you stepped into before.’ 
(51-52) 
 
Freeman translates the last part of this fragment from Heraclitus (B22:49a) this way: “In 
the same river, we both step and do not step, we are and we are not” (Freeman & Diels 
                                                 
     55. Heraclitus was called by Socrates “the weeping philosopher” according to Seneca. 
Moral and Political Essays. Translated by John M. Cooper; J.F. Procopé. Cambridge 
University Press. 1995.  Page 50 note 17.  
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28).56  
 It is the naming of things says Nietzsche that leads us into darkness. Naming and 
distinguishing is not “of the nature of things” but leads to the confusion of separating 
opposites from each other (PTAG 52). One can search in vain through all of Nietzsche’s 
published and unpublished works and not find a single label that he affixes to himself, 
except perhaps for ‘free man’ or ‘free spirit’ and even then usually indirectly or in the 
third person. Tao-chia Taoists often will not identify themselves with the name Tao, 
saying that to do so defines them in contrast to the whole and separates them from Tao:  
Reject labels…identities…conformity…convention…definitions.  
Reject names. (Deng, 365 Tao 232) 
 
If we must focus on a single thing, Nietzsche says of Heraclitus, let it be that ever-present 
moment between each moment’s death and each future moment. The only constant is 
change.  
 Kirk & Raven make the assertion that “only a very limited understanding” of 
Heraclitus is possible because of the confusion he created in his wake by not using “the 
categories of formal logic [and being] more of a metaphysician than his Ionian 
predecessors, less concerned with the mechanics of development and change than with 
the unifying reality that underlay them” (186).57  However, Heraclitus himself addresses 
this ‘confusion’ which is, he plainly states, not in the ideas themselves but in the minds of 
                                                 
     56. This is a fine example of Taoist enigma: “True words are as if contrary” (Laozi 
#78). It also brings to mind the many ways Nietzsche writes and expresses the same idea, 
e.g. ‘Why not untruth, instead?’ 
 
     57. This view is taken from Aristotle who was notoriously skeptical about all 
philosophers who preceded him. One is reminded of the same accusation of “confusion” 
often leveled at the works of Nietzsche’s, in their entirety. 
 
45 
 
 
 
men, who willfully obfuscate and deny the things they know intuitively to be so. 
Ironically, it is knowledge itself, Logos in the form of human language that makes 
knowledge invisible to the human mind.  
22:1: The Law58 (of the universe) is as here explained; but men are always 
incapable of understanding it, both before they hear it, and when they have 
heard it for the first time. For though all things come into being in 
accordance with this Law, men seem as if they had never met with it…. 
As for the rest of mankind, they are unware of what they are doing after 
they wake, just as they forget what they did while asleep. (Freeman & 
Diels 24) 
 
This is another way of saying: “…Something known by all but practiced by none.” (Wu, 
Tao teh Ching #78 159). The following fragment expands on the idea that while 
knowledge of how things really are is common to all living creatures, only the mind of 
man can obscure it from himself.  
22:2: Therefore one must follow (the universal Law, namely) that which is 
common (to all). But although the Logos is universal, the majority live as 
if they had understanding peculiar to themselves. (Freeman & Diels 24-
25) 
 
As Nietzsche says in the Preface to On the Genealogy of Morals: 
We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge [Logos]—and with 
good reason. We have never sought ourselves—how could it happen that 
we should ever find ourselves? (16).59 
 
 Further on in 22:72, Heraclitus also puts it another way, “The Law (Logos): 
though men associate with it most closely, yet they are separated from it, and those things 
                                                 
     58. “Logos, the intelligible Law of the universe, and its reasoned statement by 
Heracleitus” (Freeman & Diels 24 fn1). 
 
     59. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche describes how knowledge violates nature in 
Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex in which acts of parricide and incest reveal the “unnatural 
crime” of wisdom—how knowledge violates nature. (“The Birth of Tragedy” §9, John 
Hamilton Securitas Lecture 1 Dec. 2014) 
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which they encounter daily seem to them strange” (Freeman & Diels 29). One might add, 
in man’s defense, that of all things living or dead, only man is required to seek this 
knowledge, by virtue of having the ability to do so!  
 Heraclitus concludes in 22:50: “When you have listened, not to me but to the Law 
(Logos), it is wise to agree that all things are one” (Freeman & Diels 28; Kirk & Raven 
Fr. 196 187). To a student of Tao, Heraclitus could only be referring here to natural law, 
and perhaps confusion arises because Heraclitus uses Logos in two different senses, and 
the fragments do not distinguish between these. Indeed, in Kirk and Raven’s Fragment 
196 of Heraclitus, the sense of “Logos” is not the same as in the preceding fragments; in 
context, it refers to natural law and not to the law of knowledge, reason, and language.  
 Kirk & Raven themselves, in their summary of Fragment 196, define “Logos” as 
“the underlying coherence of things…the formula or element of arrangement common to 
all things” (186, emphasis added). This sense of Logos corresponds closely to the 
Chinese word li, “organic pattern,” which Alan Watts translates as “the actual order of 
nature” as distinguished from the Chinese word tsu, which refers to the order of things as 
measured or written and corresponds to Logos used in the sense of knowledge, reason, or 
language (Watts, 61). The noun logos is derived from the Greek verb legein that 
primarily means to gather and accumulate one’s words “in accordance with an organizing 
idea in order to speak.”60  
 “Experience,” Watts writes, “is altogether something different from words. If you 
have tasted a certain taste, even the taste of water, you know what it is. But to someone 
                                                 
     60. John Hamilton thesis note 29 November 2016. 
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who has not tasted it, it can never be explained in words because it goes far beyond 
words” (59). Watsuji Tetsuro,61 the Japanese Nietzsche scholar, moral philosopher, and 
intellectual historian echoes this view, writing:  
True philosophy is not simply the accumulation and organization of 
concepts but the ideational expression of the most direct inner experience. 
Direct pure inner experience signifies living as the essence of existence… 
If we refer to direct inner experience as intuition, this intuition lives as 
‘life itself.’ ‘Cosmic life’ is of course ceaseless creation, accordingly, 
direct inner experience, too, operates creatively. Self-expression is this 
creative activity. The arts and philosophy all derive from this. (Magnus 
and Higgins 364-65). 
 
 Nietzsche writes that Heraclitus is “cool, insensitive, in fact hostile” to reason, 
logic, and conceptual thought and that he even “seems to feel pleasure whenever he can 
contradict with an intuitively arrived-at truth” (PTAG 52). Filmmaker Woody Allen 
expresses a similar idea in the words of the character of Isaac Davis in the 1979 film 
Manhattan: “Nothing worth knowing can be understood with the mind. Everything really 
valuable has to enter you through a different opening….” (Act I: Scene 1). 
 
Parmenides of Elea (515-450 BCE) 
 Parmenides’ single known work, On Nature, also survives only in fragments.62 As 
with the other Presocratics, what interests Nietzsche most is the personality of 
Parmenides and how it is reflected in his thinking and in his philosophy. Because 
                                                 
      61. Watsuji Tetsuro (1889 – 1960) - Japanese Nietzsche scholar, moral philosopher 
and intellectual historian. Author of Nichie kenkyu, in Watsuji Tetsuro zenshu [Tokyo, 
1961], vol. I, 41. Translation by David Gordon. (from Parkes’ footnote 19, Nietzsche and 
East Asian Thought p364).  
 
     62. Reportedly the original text had 3,000 lines; approximately 160 lines of the poem 
remain today.  
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Parmenides is a man who craves and requires absolute and unquestionable certainty, he is 
tormented by the idea that the senses distort and taint our perception of reality. In contrast 
to Heraclitus, who is about the “truth grasped in intuitions,” and who “knows but does 
not calculate,” Parmenides seeks to attain truth “by the rope ladder of logic” (PTAG 69). 
Nietzsche describes Parmenides as “a nature wholly petrified by logical rigidity and 
almost transformed into a thinking machine” (70), whose method “exhibits a defiant 
talent for abstract-logical procedure, closed against all influences of sensation” (72).  
  In On Nature, Parmenides contrasts two views of reality: the way of truth, whole 
and unchanging, timeless, uniform, and necessary; and the way of opinion based on the 
world of appearances, in which one's senses lead to misconceptions of what is real.  
Pondering the issue of coming-to-be and passing away, or what he calls the existent and 
the non-existent, Parmenides puts himself in the impossible position of refusing, 
logically, to acknowledge the existence of non-existence. In spite of this, faced with the 
indisputable fact of both, Parmenides forces himself to make an intuitive leap which, “for 
natures such as Parmenides’…constitutes a kind of falling.”63  
 In order to reconcile being and nonbeing, Parmenides resorts to “qualitas occulta” 
(a hidden quality) and “even, just a little, [to] the realm of mythology” (73). In order to 
reconcile life with death, Parmenides, the self-styled empiricist, that thinking machine 
writes—to his credit--a poem to define reality; but in the end he falls back on 
mythological imagery--“the power of Aphrodite” to explain “the mystic tendency of 
opposites to attract and unite” (73). What Parmenides really cannot reconcile is the 
                                                 
     63. In Laurie Anderson’s lyrics for “Walking and Falling” she observes that walking 
is falling, then catching yourself from falling. See Appendix Chapter III. 
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conflict within himself between the pursuit of truth and the need for certainty. Nietzsche 
writes that Parmenides is “driven to fury” by propositions like Heraclitus’ that “‘We are 
and at the same time are not’” (77). 
 How do Taoists view the conundrum that gives Parmenides, as Nietzsche puts it, 
such a massive philosophical headache? Typically, they embrace Heraclitus’ “being and 
nonbeing at the same time the same and not same” (77): 
Every soul is but a part of an infinite, cosmic soul. You could subtract 
numerous souls from the world and the number of souls would not be 
diminished. Numerous souls could be born, and the number of souls 
would not be augmented. Nothing is truly destroyed, and nothing is truly 
born. Only appearances change. Therefore, people of composure [those 
who follow Tao] view the transformations of the world calmly. They 
know that these [the different permutations of phenomena] are merely 
outer manifestations of an indefinable, unlimited, and infinite reality. 
(Deng, 365 Tao 219) 
 
Taoist thought holds that there is no division between reality and appearance, the reality 
one senses within and the phenomena that appear to our senses are all manifestations of 
Tao: 
Tao is within us; Tao surrounds us. 
Part of it may be sensed, 
And is called manifestation. 
Part of it is unseen, 
And is called void.  
 
 “Our normal minds,” writes Deng, “are incapable of perceiving where there is no 
contrast.” The only way to truly comprehend and grasp Tao, the “colorless infinity that is 
the underlying reality to life” is to “plunge into the mystery itself” (222). This is what 
Heraclitus has done when he walks ‘straight into the mystic night,’ and this is where 
Nietzsche is philosophically most comfortable. 
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 Parmenides makes the usual error that the reasoning mind tends to make: 
mistaking “opposites” for mutually negating forms of being, in other words, seeing 
conflict where there is no conflict, confusing difference with opposition. Inevitably this 
leads to the no exit dead end of dualistic thinking. It takes a fearless, supple mind to 
acknowledge that things are and are not what they seem, are and are not true. By 
requiring certainty, Parmenides forfeits suppleness and fearlessness and, unlike 
Heraclitus, is unable to find it in things both as they are and as they appear to be.  
By wrenching apart the senses and the capacity for abstraction, in other 
words by splitting up mind as though it were composed of two quite 
separate capacities, [Parmenides] demolished intellect itself, encouraging 
man to indulge in that wholly erroneous distinction between ‘spirit’ and 
‘body which, especially since Plato, lies upon philosophy like a curse … 
When one makes as total a judgment as does Parmenides about the whole 
of the world, one ceases to be a scientist, an investigator into any of the 
worlds’ parts. One’s sympathy toward phenomena atrophies; one even 
develops a hatred for phenomena including oneself . . . (PTAG 79-80, 
emphasis added)  
 
Nietzsche attributes the abstraction64 of the reasoning mind from the senses and intuition 
to the wrong-headedness of Plato, Aristotle, and subsequently the Christian church, 
implying that this is the source of all human suffering both spiritually and physically. In 
Taoism, dualistic thinking is considered a natural human tendency that, once identified, 
can be amended with a small course correction that broadens as life goes on.  
 Nietzsche refers to Parmenides’ doctrine of being as “the rigor mortis of the 
coldest emptiest concept of all” (80) and in a subtle reference to Kant describes it as 
“schematism” and “a terrible energetic striving for certainty in an epoch which otherwise 
                                                 
     64. Abstraction comes from the Latin abs, meaning away from and trahere, meaning 
to draw.  
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thought mythically and whose imagination was highly mobile and fluid” (81). 
Parmenides’ schematic, abstract approach to the concept of being and the essence of all 
that is, using reason, conceptual thought and language alone, concludes that we know 
existence by being able to think about it; that we have an “organ of 
knowledge…independent of experience” that gives us direct access through thinking to 
“the essence of things” (82) without relying on those errant dissemblers--the five senses. 
By his (often sarcastic) tone and his language, Nietzsche makes clear that he thinks 
Parmenides’ system of logic manages to achieve neither certainty nor truth. Despite these 
failings, for Nietzsche Parmenides’ real accomplishment is to represent “the immensely 
significant first critique of man’s apparatus of knowledge” (79). 
 Parmenides’ concept of the Infinite has more merit than his doctrine of Being (84) 
and Nietzsche credits his student Zeno of Elea65 for skillfully illustrating the infinite by 
offering examples of apparent contradictions —giving the example of an arrow in 
motion, which is also, at any given moment, at rest in that moment.66 Can we say that the 
sum of an infinite number of positions of rest is identical to motion? If we consider an 
infinite number of positions as a catalyst of reality (the arrow in flight) then the ‘reality’ 
of an arrow in flight disappears in the face of infinity; in fact, it never really lands 
either…   
 If rest is not motion, then the arrow never really leaves the bow and time itself is 
                                                 
     65. Aristotle refers to Zeno of Elea (c. 490 – c. 430 BCE) as the inventor of dialectic, 
known for taking contradictory arguments to their absurd conclusions (reductio ad 
absurdum).  
 
     66. Think of the frozen action of individual frames of a moving picture film, for 
instance. 
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also negated. This leads Nietzsche to conclude that “all our conceptions lead to 
contradictions” (86). What Nietzsche seems to be leading up to here, at Parmenides’ 
expense, is an overarching concept of Nonduality where all contradictions are pairs of 
opposites that belong together and continually flow one into the other.  
 Nevertheless,67 Nietzsche credits Parmenides by his manner of reasoning, for 
exposing “the falsehood inherent in the absolute separation of senses and concepts, and in 
the identity of being and thinking” (89). Yet it is the fixed stance of Parmenides that 
provides Nietzsche with a great insight of his own: 
If thinking in concepts, on the part of reason, is real, then the many and 
motion must partake of reality also, for reasoned thinking is mobile 
[moving] from concept to concept. It is mobile, in other words, within a 
plurality of realities. (88) 
   
And if the senses themselves are a part of the semblance they create, then: 
…to whom do they dissemble? How, being unreal, can they deceive? 
Nonbeing cannot even practice deceit. (88-89) 
 
We cannot attack the senses and we cannot doubt thinking, insists Nietzsche; we must 
accept them both together. On top of that, we must accept that motion has being. In 
Taoist terms, the senses are part of the whole and cannot be separated from reality, and 
thinking is not a rigid, singular act but flows from one idea to the next. No one, unless 
they are truly broken in mind, has a single thought.68   
 Generously, as with Thales’ unifying principle about water, Nietzsche is able to 
                                                 
     67. It is revealing that Nietzsche devotes twenty pages of his essay on the Presocratics 
to Parmenides whose fragment of 160 lines seems to contain as many missteps as there 
are gaps, and whose fear of uncertainty became an obstacle to the clarity he was seeking.  
 
     68. A terrible irony is that this is exactly what did happen to poor Nietzsche after his 
mental breakdown in 1889. 
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see infinite value in Parmenides’ blindness. It is a Taoist principle to see an important 
opportunity in every mistake. Nietzsche simply picks up the spear where Parmenides 
dropped it and throws it further to conclude: 
…what we have now is a multiplicity which has true being; all the 
properties [including the senses] have true being, as has motion. About 
each and every moment of this world, even if we choose moments that lie 
a millennium apart, one would have to be able to say: all true essences 
contained in the world are existent simultaneously, unchanged, 
undiminished, without increase, without decrease. A millennium later 
exactly the same holds true; nothing has meanwhile changed. If, in spite of 
this the world looks totally different from time to time, this is not an 
illusion, not mere semblance, but rather the consequences of everlasting 
motion. True being is moved sometimes this way, sometimes that way, 
together asunder, upwardly downward, withinly [sic] in all directions. 
(PTAG 89-90)69 
 
 This is where Nietzsche the philosopher scientist, as well as Joan Stambaugh’s “other 
Nietzsche,” the poetic mystic (Stambaugh 135), and Nietzsche the tao-chia thinker 
converge. Because what we are left with is “a game of dice: The dice are always the 
same, but falling now this way, now that, they signify different things” (91). While 
previously Thales and Heraclitus had theorized a primal element (to which all things 
returned), Anaxagoras will add that the primal element never changes and that “matter 
itself contains true being” (91). It remains what it is, unchanged but like a pair of dice, 
taking on different qualities with each throw. Like cannot produce unlike and “the world 
is…full of many different qualities.” These qualities, although they appear to our senses 
differently and appear to be constantly changing are also “uncreated, imperishable and 
always simultaneously existent” (92). 
 What Parmenides dismisses as mere appearance to our unreliable senses are 
                                                 
     69. What Nietzsche in essence describes in this passage is the concept in modern 
physics of ‘spooky action at a distance’… 
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actually qualities of the primal element in motion. The simple observable proof of this is 
in the constant fluctuation of our own thoughts. While the older philosophers sought “to 
simplify the problem of coming-to-be by positing a single substance (water, air, fire…) it 
is now clear that all substances are original, neither created nor destroyed, which sounds a 
great deal like the first law of thermodynamics in modern physics, the law of 
conservation.70 Parmenides’ false “appearances” are simply the patterns achieved by the 
tumbling of dice into new patterns; all variations of the same whole. “The inert, stable 
dead being of Parmenides has been disposed of” declares Nietzsche, introducing 
Anaxagoras (92).  
 
Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (500-428 BCE) 
 A physikoi from the Ionian coast in Asia Minor, Anaxagoras moved to Athens 
where he lived for thirty years until he was condemned for impiety because his theory of 
the cosmos involved no divinities. Nearly 100 years after Thales of Miletus broke away 
from mythological explanations of the cosmos, the secular position is once again out of 
favor, in Athens.71 Unlike Socrates,72 who will later be sentenced to death by his own 
hand for the same crime, Anaxagoras manages to leave Athens and live out his life in 
                                                 
     70. Physicist Albert Einstein: “Energy cannot be created or destroyed, it can only be 
changed from one form to another.”   
 
     71. Such is the effect of the conventions of power--religion and government--
concentrated in the metropolis.  
 
     72. It is not certain that Socrates (469 - 399 BCE) and Anaxagoras were acquainted. 
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exile. Anaxagoras’ surviving fragments73 are all from a single book, On Natural Science, 
a scientific work in prose on nature and the cosmos.   
 From watching his own thoughts—“the indubitable succession of ideas in our 
thinking” (92) and the ordering of their constantly changing myriad forms, Anaxagoras 
concludes: 
There is something that carries in itself the origin and the beginning of 
motion and moves not only itself but something quite different from itself. 
It moves the body” (98).  
 
This something is nous,74 unlimited, whole, free of fate (moira) and of agency (the gods). 
The ordering force of nous is alone capable of initiating movement independently and the 
motion originating in nous animates all change, creating the dynamics of cause and effect 
and the permutations and patterns that those in turn create. 
…a substance whose motion does not come from outside and does not 
depend on anything else. (100-101) 
 
 In Fragment 59:4, Anaxagoras envisions an origin to the universe where “all 
Things were present in the Whole that contains the “seeds infinite in number” of “all 
Things” (Freeman & Diels 83)75 before they are separated off by the centrifugal force of 
spiraling movement initiated by nous. 
 In PTAG, Nietzsche seizes on the significance of this version of Anaxagoras’ 
arkhe: 
                                                 
     73. These fragments survive mostly as quotations in the writings of later 
philosophers—Simplicius, Plutarch, and Sextus Empiricus (Giannis P. Stamatellos, Bryn 
Mawr Classical Review 2008.05.11) http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2008/2008-05-11.html  
 
     74. In German nous is der Geist, variously translated as mind or spirit. 
  
     75. Also referenced in Chapter II, footnote 29. 
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Anaxagoras could now assume a first moment of motion in primeval time, 
as the germination point of all so-called ‘becoming,’ i.e., of all change, 
i.e., of all displacement and shifting of the eternal substances and their 
particles…there was a time…when nous had not yet influenced [matter], 
when matter was still inert…the period of Anaxagorian chaos. (PTAG 
101) 
 
Verse #25 of Laozi’s Tao te Ching makes nearly exactly the same observation about “the 
beginning of all we know”-- 
There was something chaotic yet complete here before heaven and earth 
were born. How silent and still it was, how singular and unaltered, turning 
without stop. Perhaps it was the mother of all under heaven. I do not know 
its name, but it must be given a word, call it Tao. (Deng, Lunar Tao 386)76 
 
 An earlier section of the 59:4 fragment describes this chaotic completeness, the mother 
of all things this way: 
Before these things were separated off, all things were together, nor was 
any colour distinguishable, for the mixing of all Things prevented this, 
(namely) the mixing of moist and dry and hot and cold and bright and 
dark, and…seeds infinite in number, not at all like one another. (Freeman 
& Diels 83) 
 
The Laozi #14 also describes the ancient beginning of everything as colorless, noiseless, 
and formless. As a physikoi Anaxagoras would know that individual colors are only 
visible when they are dispersed and separated from light by means of a prism. He also 
has the Greek grasp of complementary opposites. 
 Nietzsche devotes the whole last quarter of PTAG to Anaxagoras. It is worthwhile 
to cite Anaxagoras’ fragments 59:11 and the lengthier 59:12 for these are the heart of the 
matter: where Greek physis, Anaxagorian nous, Nietzschean spirit (Geist), and the Tao all 
converge-- 
59:11: In everything there is a portion of everything except Mind; and 
some things contain Mind also.”)  
                                                 
     76. See Appendix Chapter III for Wilhelm translation of Laozi #25. 
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59:12 (part): Other things all contain a part of everything, but Mind is 
infinite and self-ruling, and is mixed with no Thing, but is alone by itself. 
… [For] the things mixed (with Mind) would have prevented it, so that it 
could not rule over any Thing in the same way as it can being alone by 
itself. For it is the finest of all Things, and the purest, and has complete 
understanding of everything, and has the greatest power. All things which 
have life, both the greater and the less, are ruled by Mind. (Freeman & 
Diels 84) 
 
Like Parmenides, Anaxagoras separates Mind from what Mind has created as well as 
from the source of Mind, which is the brain and Nietzsche argues with this concept. As 
we have learned by now, when Nietzsche expresses an opinion about a Presocratic, he 
reveals as much or more about his own point of view:  
Empirically speaking, it seems curiously eccentric, in fact, to separate the 
‘spirit’ [nous], the brain-product, from its causa and to imagine its 
continued existence after such separation. But that is what Anaxagoras 
did; he forgot the brain, its astonishingly elaborate refinement, the 
delicacy and convolutedness of its labyrinths, and instead decreed the 
‘spirit as such’. (PTAG 100) 
 
Nietzsche invariably insists on wholeness, often at the expense of logic. Wholeness is his 
guide. He never fails to identify the common human error of thinking dualistically. 
Nietzsche calls this way of thinking, common as it is, “logically highly suspect” (105).  
Fragment 59:12 continues, 
Mind took command of the universal revolution, so as to make (things) 
revolve at the outset. And at first things began to revolve from some small 
point, but now the revolution extends over a greater area, and will spread 
even further. And the things which were mixed together, and separated 
off, and divided, were all understood by Mind. And whatever they were 
going to be, and whatever things were then in existence that are not now, 
and all things that now exist and whatever shall exist—all were arranged 
by Mind, as also the revolution now followed by the stars, the sun and the 
moon, and the Air and Aether which were separated off. It was this 
revolution which caused the separation off. And dense separates from rare, 
and hot from cold, and bright from dark, and dry from wet. There are 
many portions of many things. And nothing is absolutely separated off or 
divided the one from the other except Mind. Mind is all alike, both the 
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greater and the less. But nothing else is like anything else, but each 
individual thing is and was most obviously that of which it contains the 
most. (Freeman & Diels 84-85) 
 
And finally, 59:13: 
And when Mind began the motion, there was a separating-off77 from all 
that was being moved; and all that Mind set in motion was separated; and 
as things were moving and separating off, the revolution greatly increased 
this separation. (Freeman & Diels 85) 
 
 The Anaxagorian concept that “everything originates from everything” (PTAG 
102) implies that a mind resembles the universe and the universe resembles a mind. In 
terms of mankind, every individual is a whole being part of a Whole Being, that is, the 
cosmos.  
The last two lines of Laozi #14 say almost the same thing: 
Know That which is beyond all beginnings  
   and you will know everything here and now 
Know everything in this moment 
   and you will know the Eternal Tao. (Star trans. 27) 
 
Anaxagoras’ ‘proof’ for his hypothesis is based on the movement of opposites and in 
PTAG Nietzsche offers the example of white snow turning into black water, solid to 
liquid: to illustrate that they must already possess a portion of the others’ qualities (PTAG 
103).  
 Another way to visualize this proof is the Taoist image of yin-yang described in 
Chapter II:  a circle split into a swirl of black and a swirl of white each containing the 
                                                 
     77. Freeman adds a footnote here about the translation: “Diels-Kranz make Nous the 
subject, and translate: ‘Mind severed itself from the moving Whole.’ But the reference is 
to three events: the starting of the revolution by Mind; the separation of a portion from 
the Whole; and the internal sifting under the revolution” (85). She may be referring to the 
aóristos the Greek indefinite or “middle” voice. See Appendix II for the Aorist Greek 
Middle Voice. 
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seed of its opposite. These are the seeds of transformation and movement, eternal 
balancing and ordering—cosmos out of chaos--contained in the figure of a spiral. 
Nietzsche is specific about the kind of motion that Anaxagoras attributes to nous, calling 
it “a definite and a wisely instituted motion” demonstrating a “marvelous efficiency.” 
This circular movement begins as a small turn “at some random point in the chaotic 
mixture” spiraling in “ever greater orbits” and “by its centrifugal force pulling out all 
likes to join their likes” (108). Everything follows from this creative process…just as it 
does in philosophical Taosim (tao-chia). 
 “Is it not a sublime thought,” Nietzsche enthuses,  
to derive the magnificence of the cosmos . . . from a single, simple, purely 
mechanical movement, from a mathematical figure in motion…a type of 
oscillation which, once having begun, is necessary and predictable in its 
course [attaining] effects which are the equal of the wisest 
calculations…and of the utmost planning of purposefulness—but without 
being them. (PTAG 109-110) 
 
Anaxagoras concludes that the nature of the force or element that creates the mind that 
asks what it is, is Mind (Nous). And the expression of the nature of that force or element 
is matter. As Nietzsche puts it, 
…we must presuppose that the impelling nous starts suddenly, with 
frightful force—so fast that we must call its motion a ‘whirl.’ This is how 
Democritus,78 too, described it…79 Hence we get, for the beginning, a 
point rotating about itself with an infinitely small material content…[and] 
the first movement describes a circle whose radius is randomly larger that 
a single point (111-112).  
 
Nous--spirit, mind, faculty of ideas, faculty of understanding. Nietzsche seems to say 
                                                 
     78. Democritus c. 460 – 370 BCE. 
 
     79. Today, physicists might call it a ‘Big Bang.’  
   
60 
 
 
 
that, in fact, this nous could be anything. It could be what Taoists call Tao. And if the one 
and the many are the same thing, it is in everything and so it could be said that the whole 
universe, the cosmos, is nous. The motion that sets itself in motion. The eye that sees 
itself. From the perspective of some, the first mind or a divine intelligence; from the 
perspective of others, an arbitrary point in a random chaos.  
 As Anaxagoras does, so does Taoist thought envision the beginning of everything 
as a single point that begins to turn. Moreover, Taoist thought incorporates this “still 
point of existence” (Deng, 365 Tao 117) and its spinning, spiraling movement as a point 
of departure for meditation practice. This still point is the creative source for humans as 
well as for the universe: 
The mind is in spinning wheels at the navel, heart, throat, head. The 
connecting shaft is emptiness. Without an unobstructed route, energy 
cannot flow…if we want simplicity and tranquility, we need only go to the 
center of the spinning mind where it is empty and still. Thus it is said that 
diversity comes from the revolving of the wheels and origins come from 
the central void. (181) 
 
 A single point of departure--in the mind of man as well as in the Mind of the 
universe. The key to meditation, Taoist thought advises, is to “make the mind a single 
point,” and thus take on the attributes of the creative void and the expanding universe. On 
a cosmic scale—whether in Taoist thought, the pre-nous “chaos” of Anaxagoras, or in 
quantum physics--it is the emptiness of the void that makes motion possible, which in 
turn results in the diversity of the universe.  
 Sometimes the world as we see it and the world as it is, coincide. This was 
particularly so for the Presocratics, when each one grasped a piece of a greater whole that 
they intuitively understood from the fragment that they held. For Thales, it was the 
insight of a single source; for Anaximander, a source that is boundless and unlimited; for 
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Heraclitus, the mystical perception of the interplay of opposites and the certainty of 
constant change; for Parmenides, the limits of logic and abstraction; and for Anaxagoras 
the conclusion that the one and the many are the same thing and that all things contain 
nous.  
 The Tao is what these first (Western) philosophers--these physikoi--had got a hold 
of and attempted to define from their own perspectives—instinctively or scientifically, 
broadly or narrowly, often from an either/or-ness. “The Tao that can be spoken, is not the 
Tao.” The plurality of these perspectives on the eternal Tao is expressed in Laozi #14: 
From nothingness to fullness and back again to nothingness 
This formless form 
This imageless image cannot be grasped by mind or might 
Try to face it 
In what place will you stand? 
Try to follow it 
To what place will you go? (Star trans. 27) 
  
As in the ancient parable of the six blind sages describing an elephant,80 Nietzsche 
navigates through the Presocratics to assemble an intuitively arrived-at picture of the 
whole. Viewing the Presocratics through the lens of Nietzsche’s mind continually points 
to a tao-chia perspective. 
 
Random Free Choice 
 Near the end of Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks Nietzsche writes that 
the inception of movement in the creative void, the beginning of everything, is at the 
same time voluntary and random: “a voluntary act of nous” upon a random physical point 
                                                 
     80. See Appendix II Chapter III for the Parable of the Elephant. 
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out of “an enormous number of points” (112). Everything that exists follows from this, 
just as it is described in the Tao te Ching #42. 
Tao produces one. 
One produces two. 
Two produces three.  
Three produce myriad things 
Myriad things, backed by yin and embracing yang 
Achieve harmony by integrating their energy. (Lin trans. 85)  
 
 Lin’s commentary on this verse describes Tao as “the pregnant void—an infinite 
field of nothingness bursting with potentialities,” which gives birth to an embryonic 
universe with no opposites that in turn splits into yin and yang (Lin 84). The dynamic 
interaction of two—the yin-yang—is what gives rise to the multiplicity and variety of all 
things. This view is not uncommon in most ancient cosmologies. What distinguishes both 
the tao-chia perspective and Nietzsche’s perspective on the Presocratics is the idea of 
randomness absent divinity, design, or metaphysical agency.81   
 Why, Nietzsche then asks, should nous choose a random82 material particle, and 
set it in motion “in a whirling dance” (PTAG 112)?  Nietzsche begins his answer with 
Anaxagoras, and finishes with Heraclitus: 
Anaxagoras would say that ‘Nous has the privilege of free random 
choice…has no duty and hence no purpose or goal to pursue. Having once 
started with its motion, and thus having set itself a goal, it would be…To 
                                                 
     81. The notion of randomness (one of the key themes of this thesis) will become part 
of the materialist tradition later associated with Epicurus (341 – 270 BCE) and even later 
with Lucretius (99 -55 BCE).  
 
     82. Note the definition of random: to have no definite aim or purpose (1650s); at great 
speed, i.e. carelessly or haphazardly (1560s). From an alteration of the Middle English 
randon:  impetuosity, speed (c. 1300); from Old French randon: rush, disorder, force, 
impetuosity; from randir: to run fast; from Frankish rant: a running; from Proto-
Germanic randa, also the origin of Old High German rennen: to run, and Old English 
rinnan: to flow, to run. Source: 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?allowed_in_frame=0&search=random  
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complete this sentence is difficult. Heraclitus did; he said, ‘…a game.’ 
(PTAG 112) 
 
Anaxagoras’ nous is not a static objective or end result (causa finalis)—a ‘what’--but an 
active expression of ‘how’ the world works (causa efficiens). Not thought, but the whirl 
of thought—a spiraling motion, a way, an action, a direction, a turn and a return—not an 
intellectual interpretation or analysis but the action of thought itself. This is nous.  
All its acts, including that of primal motion, are acts of ‘free will,’ whereas 
the entire remainder of the world grows under strict determination—
mechanical determination in fact. But absolute free will can only be 
imagined as purposeless, roughly like a child’s game or an artist’s creative 
play-impulse. (PTAG 116) 
 
In Anaxagoras, Nietzsche recognizes a naturally rational idea embodying the coexistence 
of the random motion of free thought with the inherent pattern and order of life. This is 
Taoist thinking, pure and simple. It is also a reflection of the dynamic balance of the 
Dionysian (free and random) and Apollonian principles (logic and order) that Nietzsche 
articulates in the Birth of Tragedy (1872): a fusion of apparent opposites that represents a 
restoration to wholeness and, at the same time, the open-ended cycle of continuous 
change and renewal.  
 
Free Will & Fate 
 The concept of ‘free, random choice’ is a compelling one for Nietzsche. Can one 
choose one’s “fate” by accepting random occurrence as a singular event, eternally and 
uniquely one’s own alone? What is fate? In Greek mythology fate is moira personified in 
the three Fates (Moirae)83 who do not determine fate but only supervise it.  Nietzsche 
                                                 
     83. They are the spinner, Clotho, who spins the thread of life; the measurer, Lachesis, 
who draws lots to determine the length of each life; and the inevitable, Atropos, who 
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embraces his own fate because it is his, because it is the natural order of life, and because 
he has the freedom to respond as he wishes to it: 
My formula for human greatness is amor fati: that one wants nothing to be 
different, not in the future, not in the past, not for all eternity. Not only to 
endure what is necessary, still less to conceal it — all idealism is falseness 
in the face of necessity — , but to love it. . . .  (Ecce Homo “Why I Am So 
Clever” §10 37)  
 
No event in life is predetermined but as soon as it happens, it is done—fatto--and there is 
no turning back; it is only possible to move forward and make other choices. There is a 
strong element of time in fate so-called, usually determined by the work of single 
moments and split-second decisions; subject to the most fleeting of human emotions and 
decisions—our own and others’--in conjunction with random events and chance. Couples 
meet and have children or they don’t. Children grow up or they don’t. In the end all of 
life is a series of random, yet choice-filled events with consequences that unfold over a 
long period of time. 
 Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks concludes by describing the error of 
those who explain phenomena by the purpose we assign to them rather than by the 
emptiness from which they originate. This, Nietzsche writes, is  
the ordinary confusion of teleologists who in their admiration…of the 
marvelous agreement of the parts with the whole [in nature] assume that 
whatever exists for the intellect originated with the intellect, and whatever 
the intellect manages to do under the guidance of purpose must also have 
been created in nature by thoughtfulness and a concept of purpose.  (117) 
 
This passage ends with a parenthetical reference to Schopenhauer: “(Schopenhauer, 
WWR, Vol. II, Book 2, Chapter 26 on Teleology)” (117). The misapprehension of an 
                                                 
chooses the manner and moment of death when she cuts the thread of each life with her 
shears. 
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apparent contradiction between the mechanical orderliness of nature and “the free, 
arbitrary choice” of the spirit (nous) often leads to confusing results with causes (116) but 
as Schopenhauer writes in On the Will from Nature:  
It is not the intellect that has produced nature, but nature that has produced 
the intellect. (51) 
  
Confusion and contradictory language are unavoidable in attempting to describe how, out 
of emptiness and chaos, a universe arises where the blind mechanical movement and 
purposeless free will envisioned by the Presocratics results in order and efficiency. 
Nietzsche ends the essay by reasserting: 
…a free undetermined nous, dependent on itself alone…. [with] its quality 
of randomness, hence its ability to activate unconditionally, 
undeterminedly, guided by neither causes nor ends. (117)  
 
The universe is a patterned sequence of events begun randomly. And nature is orderly 
and efficient because it operates as a whole, not for any other reason than that it is a 
whole and every part of the whole has a common source.  
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Chapter IV 
 
Shared Perspectives 
 
You are the only student you have. All the others leave eventually. Have you been making 
yourself shallow with making others eminent? 
~ Rumi (Barks 64) 
 
 As we have seen with Nietzsche’s considered appraisal of Parmenides, much can 
be learned from taking a wrong turn, turning a blind eye, or being consumed with a fixed 
idea. The same can be said about the effect of the influence of Arthur Schopenhauer on 
Nietzsche. For what it reveals, it is worthwhile to take a closer look at his shifting 
assessment of Schopenhauer and how it opened up Nietzsche’s own vistas and 
perspectives. 
  
Part One – Nietzsche and Schopenhauer 
  Nietzsche’s most important intuitions and insights coalesced in response to his 
intense early interest in Arthur Schopenhauer,84 whose nihilistic view of the hollow 
reality behind the subjective experience of phenomena helped crystallize Nietzsche’s own 
(opposing) views on the creative void and the will.  
                                                 
     84. 1788-1860 – German philosopher best known for The World as Will and 
Representation, (1818), among the first thinkers in Western philosophy to embrace and 
introduce the tenets of Eastern philosophy to Europe. 
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 When Nietzsche came upon a copy of Arthur Schopenhauer’s book, The World as 
Will and Idea85 in the fall of 1865 he claims to have read it in one sitting. A.J. Hoover 
says, “Something clicked inside him…. It was like looking in a mirror” (Hoover 3). What 
‘clicked’ exactly? What did Nietzsche see in the mirror of Schopenhauer? What 
Nietzsche saw was the courage and independence of Schopenhauer’s rejection of social 
and academic security, and how he voluntarily accepted the suffering that resulted for the 
sake of remaining true to his convictions (UM III:4 152).86   
 Moreover, by publishing WWR Schopenhauer became the first post-
Enlightenment German philosopher to publically express something that aligned with 
what Nietzsche had also intuited: that the values man places on morality and existence 
itself are inevitably subjective and therefore these values are merely representations with 
no fixed meaning. Schopenhauer calls this absence of meaning nihilism, a concept that 
Nietzsche will come to understand in a completely different way. 
 Schopenhauer also identifies the beginning point for which there is no cause, the 
underlying reality in an arbitrary universe--as a primordial “Will,” reflected in mankind 
as an instinctive “will to power.”  For Nietzsche, the most compelling aspects of this 
doctrine are the concept of apeiron, and the qualities that Schopenhauer assigns to it: that 
it is experienced directly, in the body as well as in the mind, through the direct 
knowledge of pain, hunger, desire, suffering and despair; and that it is “intuitively 
accessible without the mediation of understanding or cognition.”87 These ideas held a 
                                                 
     85. More widely known as The World as Will and Representation (WWR). 
 
     86. This is almost exactly what Nietzsche himself will face in the calamitous wake of 
the publication of The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music in 1872. 
 
     87. JH: Life, Desire and Thought, “In Exile from Reality” Lecture notes 9 Nov. 2015.  
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powerful appeal for Nietzsche just as he had admired Thales’ conviction about a single 
original material of existing things and Anaximander’s unifying principle of an arbitrary, 
primordial first cause.  
 When Nietzsche met the composer Richard Wagner in Leipzig in 1868,88 the two 
men developed an immediate affinity around music, with a shared enthusiasm for 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine that of all the creative arts music stands closest to the ultimate 
reality of existence, being not a representation but an unmediated experience of the Will 
itself, the one solace in a life of meaningless suffering:  
It stands quite apart from all the others. In it we do not recognize the copy, 
the repetition, of any Idea of the inner nature of the world. Yet it is such a 
great and exceedingly fine art, its effect on man's innermost nature is so 
powerful, and it is so completely and profoundly understood by him in his 
innermost being as an entirely universal language, whose distinctness 
surpasses even that of the world of perception itself… (WWR 256) 
 
Nietzsche agreed completely since his own response to music had always been what 
Sigmund Freud describes as an “oceanic feeling” of “something limitless, unbounded” 
and a sense “of being one with the external world as a whole” (Civilization and Its 
Discontents 24).89 Freud himself made a point of avoiding this kind of experience: “I 
have removed it, so to speak, from my path” he once wrote in a letter to his friend 
Romain Rolland.90  But Nietzsche, like his ‘untimely’ friend Heraclitus, was fearless in 
                                                 
 
     88. Nietzsche is introduced by his doctoral advisor, Albrecht Ritschl, a close personal 
friend of the Wagners. 
 
     89. Freud’s The Future of an Illusion (1927) deals exclusively with the idea that this 
sensation is the underlying basis of religious feeling.  
 
     90. Just before Civilization and its Discontents appeared, Freud wrote to Rolland: 
“Don’t expect any assessment of the ‘oceanic feeling.’ I am doing my best, on the 
contrary, to distance myself from the feeling by analyzing it. I have removed it, so to 
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the face of mystery, uncertainty, and what his feelings could reveal to him; these things 
lay right in the center of his path.91  
 
Untimely Meditations 
 In 1873, around the same time as he wrote PTAG, Nietzsche began to publish a 
series of essays he will call Untimely Meditations (1873-1876). It had been ten years 
since he was a university student in Bonn and in Leipzig and read Schopenhauer.  By 
now, he had experienced the calamitous rejection of The Birth of Tragedy, a worsening 
state of health, and was no longer close to the Wagners (although his sister Elizabeth 
continued to trail after the celebrity couple).92 Nietzsche changed because his own 
growing experience and intuition led him down a different path and to other conclusions.  
Merely reading Schopenhauer, who died in 1860, had not been enough for the mature 
Nietzsche who wanted, just as he had with the Presocratics, to “see through the book and 
imagine the living man” (UM 136). Every great philosophy is a personal confession, “a 
type of involuntary and unaware memoir” (BGE 1955, 1:6, 6). He writes in 
“Schopenhauer as Educator” (SaE):  
                                                 
speak, from my path. How foreign the worlds in which you travel are to me! Mysticism is 
as closed to me as music.” (JH: Life, Desire and Thought, “Love and Death” Lecture 
notes 2 Nov. 2015)  
 
     91. Ernest Jones, a close friend of Freud’s writes that in a letter to Jones Freud claims 
that Nietzsche had a "more penetrating knowledge of himself than any man who ever 
lived or was likely to live" (Jones,  344).  
 
     92. Christopher Janaway cites the diary entry of Cosima Wagner on December 24, 
1976: “Nice letter from Prof. Nietzsche, though informing us that he now rejects 
Schopenhauer’s teachings!” (Willing and Nothingness 13). Nietzsche remained cordial 
with the Wagners but from a distance. 
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I profit from a philosopher only insofar as he can be an example…this 
example must be supplied by his outward life and not merely in his 
books—[in the same way] in which the philosophers of Greece taught, 
through their bearing, what they wore and ate, and their morals, rather 
than by what they said, let alone by what they wrote. (UM 136-137) 
 
To Nietzsche’s mind a man’s philosophy is not an abstraction but the man’s life in whole. 
As a student looking for a master (in the sense of a model or guide) Nietzsche expected to 
learn to recognize and develop the strengths particular to his center as well as to cultivate 
his peripheral, potential strengths into “a harmonious relationship” (UM 130). The task of 
education then is “to mould the whole man into a living solar and planetary system and to 
understand its higher laws of motion” (131). 
 By higher laws of motion Nietzsche refers to the dynamics of opposing forces and 
the order and balance inherent in the open-ended cycle of change and renewal that he 
describes at the end of PTAG. It is a system in which no single force dominates 
indefinitely but inevitably flows into its opposite continuously in a pattern of ceaseless 
motion and harmonious balancing. He is quite simply applying the laws of the cosmos as 
he understands them to his own education and the development of his inner life. A basic 
principle of Taoist thought is that yin and yang may oppose one another and may blend, 
but they can never remain in a state of balance, which would be statis, and Taoists do not 
detect stasis anywhere in the universe. “There is always some very tiny bit that is off 
center, out of balance…it is this tension that allows for ongoing movement” (Deng, 
Scholar Warrior 190). This principle is particularly applicable applies to the dynamics of 
Nietzsche’s intense connection to Schopenhauer. 
 In the first lines of the introduction to Willing and Nothingness, Christopher 
Janaway summarizes Schopenhauer this way: 
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At the summit of Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophy in The World as Will 
and Representation stands a chilling verdict: that not being born would 
have been preferable to living, and that salvation can be attained only if 
the will to life within the individual turns and denies itself. (1) 
 
Janaway compares Nietzsche without Schopenhauer to “Hamlet without the Ghost” 
wondering “how much of Nietzsche’s thought” was shaped by his efforts to distance 
himself from his old exemplar and whether he would have arrived at ‘saying Yes to life’” 
without first needing to say No to Schopenhauer (1). The answer simply lies in the fact 
that seeking such a teacher, Nietzsche found him. To paraphrase Emerson: we carry it 
with us or we find it not.93 
 In the Untimely Meditations Nietzsche does find the wherewithal to “‘say No’ to 
his age and to his fellow scholars, and hence to significant parts of his own self” (xxv-
vi).94  In “Schopenhauer as Educator” Nietzsche describes Schopenhauer’s outlook and 
conclusions as pessimistic and life denying, and objects to Schopenhauer’s version of 
Buddhism as a negative or ‘passive’ form of nihilism, no better than any other kind of 
religious escapism. Education, Nietzsche writes, is a process of liberating oneself from 
“those elements incompatible with one’s true (future) self” (UM, xix). His view of 
Schopenhauer now is similar to his appreciation of Parmenides: fully embracing the 
contribution made by a “great thinking machine” while rejecting the dogmatic need for 
absolutes. Indeed, all four of the meditations and most of Nietzsche’s subsequent works 
can be regarded as an ongoing “critique of man’s apparatus of knowledge” (PTAG 79). In 
                                                 
     93. “Though we travel the world over to find the beautiful, we must carry it with us, or 
we find it not” (Emerson 278). 
  
     94. It may be interesting to note that Schopenhauer was thirty years old when he 
published WWR and that Nietzsche published the third essay in the Meditations, 
“Schopenhauer as Educator,” on his own thirtieth birthday, October 15 1874.  
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the case of flawed heroes, the critique is usually accompanied by a simultaneous 
appreciation of that that hero’s contribution. As far as Nietzsche is concerned uncertainty 
and contradiction must be embraced as parts of a whole; otherwise one only gets half the 
picture.   
 
Schopenhauer & Buddhism 
 There is little discussion by Nietzsche in SaE of Schopenhauer’s involvement 
with Buddhism other than crediting him for introducing “whole nations” to “the history 
of India” and “almost the history of Indian philosophy” (UM 137).95  Brobjer tells us that 
Nietzsche had also read and written about Eastern philosophy and its cultural influences 
on ancient Greece and Europe beginning with his first philosophical essay at Schulpforta 
(Brobjer, 3). In Nietzsche and Buddhism, Freny Mistry writes: 
Explicit evidence of [Nietzsche’s] positive concern with Vedantic studies 
is provided by his correspondence with Paul Duessen whom he befriended 
since his schooldays. It was Nietzsche, in fact, who introduced Deussen to 
Schopenhauer’s writings, a circumstance, which eventually culminated in 
Deussen’s intensive preoccupation with the Upanishads…” (Mistry 15-16) 
 
Mistry argues that Nietzsche’s often vehement objections to Buddhism96 were “not so 
much directed against Buddhism per se, but were “‘negative reactions to the cult of 
                                                 
     95. Note the qualifying “almost.” If Schopenhauer did indeed introduce Eastern 
thought to the West, it was in the form of Theraveda Buddhism, which emphasizes 
individual salvation in contrast to Mahayana Buddhism, which suggests that all humanity 
rises and falls together. There is no real conflict between these schools—each is suited to 
the needs of those who are attracted to them. (Ryiuchi Abe, Buddhism and Japanese 
Artistic Traditions Lecture 06 Feb 2014)  
 
     96. Famously, Nietzsche writes in an unpublished notebook: “I could become the 
Buddha of Europe, which actually would be the opposite to the Indian one” (Braak 3; 
cited from KSA 10, 4[2]). 
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Buddhism as Nietzsche found it fostered by the worldview of a Schopenhauer or a 
Wagner” (Braak 13n6: Mistry 115). Even as he recognized the wisdom that they may 
have represented, the Buddhist practice or texts that Nietzsche was exposed to never 
offered a context that he could accept or embrace. Thinking perhaps of Schopenhauer or 
of his own contemporaries, he writes some years later (1878) in the fourth Meditation, 
“Richard Wagner in Bayreuth”: 
Thus our contemporary scholars and philosophers do not employ the 
wisdom of the Indians and the Greeks so as to grow wise and calm within 
themselves: the sole purpose of their work is to create for the present day 
an illusory reputation for wisdom. (UM 220) 
 
Perhaps it is noteworthy that Nietzsche considers the Greeks and Eastern philosophy 
together in this context.  
 It may be enlightening to consider the nature of Schopenhauer’s actual 
relationship to Eastern philosophy since he claims his own philosophy to be deeply 
influenced by Buddhism, and that his doctrine of the will corresponds to the first three of 
the Buddhist Four Noble Truths (Janaway, Self and World in Schopenhauer's Philosophy, 
28). The first three of these are that 1) life is suffering; 2) the cause of suffering is 
desire;97 and 3) there is a way out of suffering. The fourth Buddhist Noble Truth is that 
the way that frees us from suffering is the “Noble Eightfold Path,” which consists of right 
                                                 
     97. “Desire” is shorthand for what is called the “Twelve Links of Causation”: 1) 
ignorance, based on 2) mental formations, on which depend 3) consciousness, which 
depends on 4) mind and body, which depend on 5) the senses, which depend upon 6) 
contact, which is linked to 7) sensation, which leads to 8) desire or craving, which lead to 
9) attachment, which follows from 10) becoming, which results from 11) birth, which 
leads inevitably to 12) old age and death, sorrow, misery, grief, and despair. (Mitchell 40) 
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view, right aspiration, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right 
thinking, and mindful concentration or meditation. (Mitchell, 19).98 
 It is significant that Schopenhauer’s way to freedom from suffering deviates from 
the fourth noble truth’s way to freedom from suffering.  Right acting, right thinking, and 
their accompanying virtues have no place in Schopenhauer’s amendment. In their place 
Schopenhauer puts the negation of the self and the will—the will that he has already 
asserted is inextricably bound to the life force itself. Therefore, the originating “Will” and 
the corresponding will in man lead inevitably to a life of suffering for which 
Schopenhauer’s remedy is to renounce the will entirely and to seek relief in 
desirelessness. This doctrine is in effect a closed system—a far cry from, indeed 
antipodal to Nietzsche’s deep sense of an open-ended cycle of continuous change and 
renewal.  
 If anything, the path of someone following Buddhism’s fourth noble truth sounds 
a great deal more like Nietzsche’s Presocratics, i.e. “engaged in philosophy, as in 
everything else, as civilized human beings, and with highly civilized aims” (PTAG 31) 
than the direction taken by Schopenhauer in WWR. In spite of his self-avowed Buddhist 
beliefs, Schopenhauer’s elimination of the fourth noble truth suggests that his belief in 
these principles is superficial and selective, in order to accord with the points he wishes 
to make about his own philosophy. Although Nietzsche loudly rejects the ‘passive 
nihilism’ of Buddhism, his own life exhibits a great deal more congruity with the 
principles of right living than Schopenhauer’s, as Mistry and others have pointed out. 
                                                 
     98. Ryiuchi Abe, Buddhism and Japanese Artistic Traditions Lecture 06 Feb 2014.  
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Buddhism & Nihilism 
 Burton Watson,99 translator of the third century Mahayana Buddhist text The 
Lotus Sutra defines the Mahayana Buddhist concept of emptiness or void (shunyata) in 
nearly a tao-chia way: 
The world perceived through the senses, the phenomenal world as we 
know it, was described in early Buddhism as ‘empty’ because it was 
taught that all such phenomena arise from causes and conditions, are in a 
constant state of flux, and are destined to change and pass away in time. . . 
changing as they do from instant to instant. But in Mahayana thought it 
became customary to emphasize not the negative but rather the positive 
aspects or import of the doctrine of Emptiness. If all phenomena are 
characterized by the quality of Emptiness, then Emptiness must constitute 
the unchanging and abiding nature of existence, and therefore the absolute 
or unchanging world must be synonymous with the phenomenal one. 
Hence all mental and physical distinctions that we perceive or conceive of 
with our minds must be part of a single underlying unity. (Watson xv, 
emphasis added)  
 
Again, Schopenhauer deviates considerably from this more or less neutral, almost 
Presocratic concept of the void, assigning a negative almost a menacing, existential 
connotation to it: a great empty abyss of depression and misery, lacking and lifeless. Is it 
possible that Schopenhauer’s particular conception of Buddhism—his negative 
perspective, one might say—is what leads him to the view that being born in the first 
place is a priori a failure to have reached enlightenment in the previous life? According 
to this view, if you are born at all, then you have obviously already failed.  
 In stark contrast, Watson’s description of the Buddhist void is a positive one and 
shares an affinity with the Presocratic concepts of unity and wholeness. In it, 
                                                 
     99. Burton Watson (1925- ) first visited Japan in 1945 and has lived there since 1973. 
He is a translator and student of both Japanese and Chinese poetry and texts, and 
practices in the Zen Buddhist tradition. 
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subject/object distinctions melt away and such dualities are simply the appearance of a 
whole that is in a state of constant transformation and change.  This may be how to 
interpret Nietzsche’s own positive view of nihilism, in stark contrast to Schopenhauer’s 
negative nihilism. For Nietzsche, life is a positive reality, born out of a creative void; he 
is all the more appreciative of it because of—not in spite of--his personal experience with 
frequent illness and great suffering. The positive embrace and acceptance of nihilism is 
literally a precondition for any kind of creative growth. 
 Buried deep in The Will to Power,100 Elizabeth Förster’s posthumously edited 
selections often lifted out of context from her brother’s unpublished notebooks,101 
Nietzsche may refer to Schopenhauer’s negative nihilism when he writes: 
Man seeks ‘the truth’: a world that is not self-contradictory, not deceptive, 
does not change, a true world—a world in which one does not suffer…. 
(WP 316) 
 
Why is it that [man] derives suffering from change, deception, 
contradiction? and why not rather his happiness?— 
 
[The view that] change and happiness exclude one another…the world as 
it ought to be exists; this world, in which we live, is an error—this world 
of ours ought not to exist… What kind of man reflects in this way? An 
unproductive, suffering kind, a kind weary of life… They posit it as 
already available, they seek ways and means of reaching it. “Will to 
truth”—as the impotence of the will to create. The fiction of a world that 
corresponds to our desires [is] a psychological trick… (WP “585 Spring-
Fall 1887; rev. Spring-Fall 1888” 317, emphasis added) 
 
A nihilist is a man who judges of the world as it is that it ought not to be, 
and of the world as it ought to be that it does not exist. According to this 
view, our existence (action, suffering, willing, feeling) has no meaning: 
                                                 
     100. Published posthumously in 1908. 
 
     101. Nietzsche translator and biographer Walter Kaufman points out in a footnote that 
these notes are compiled from often widely separated sections of Nietzsche’s notebooks, 
and the subsequent “inadequacy [of] the systematic arrangement of The Will to Power” 
(WP fn 39, 318).  
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the pathos of 'in vain' is the nihilists' pathos — at the same time, as pathos, 
an inconsistency on the part of the nihilists. (318) 
 
Förster’s inane editing aside, we can interpret these words to our own ends, just as others 
have done. My interpretation is that Nietzsche rejects this other world, this paradise, this 
heaven, this reward for a life of suffering and renunciation, self-abnegation and virtue—
as fictional ‘values’ that to the son and grandson of Lutheran pastors, sound a little too 
familiar.  Change and happiness are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, as Heraclitus 
insists, this is what makes the game of life delightful. 
 What Nietzsche comes to recognize in nihilism—just as he does with the reality 
of suffering--is an opportunity, not only for progress but for creation itself. The world as 
it ought to be does exist, says Nietzsche, and it is not a fiction created by people who 
simply want to leave the only life we have, and find salvation and reward in another 
world. Rather, the world that ought to be is this world and being in it is our greatest gift.   
 For Nietzsche, the object of being is not to cultivate a desirelessness smacking of 
late Stoicism, but to cultivate a healthy desire for life as it is and to live productively—
that is, creatively--in concert with everything else in it.102  
 
 
 
                                                 
     102. The cultivation of a healthy desire for life reminds us of the ancient debate 
between Stoics and Epicureans – Stoics opting (like Schopenhauer) for a kind of 
impassive desirelessness to find happiness and the Epicureans’ assertion that man has 
free will in order to live life to the fullest. Partly for this reason and partly because, based 
on the theories of Democritus and Leucippus, Epicureans held that all thoughts are 
merely atoms swerving randomly in the empty space of the void, Nietzsche opted for the 
Epicureans. (JH comments 24 Jan. 2017) 
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Part Two – The Liberated Nietzsche 
 “We are responsible to ourselves for our own existence…” Nietzsche writes in 
SaE (UM 128). The teacher Nietzsche was seeking was not Schopenhauer but himself.103 
A teacher who has always been with him, both at his center and all around him as he 
moves forward on a path that is increasingly his own and increasingly in touch with the 
world around him:  
There exists in the world a single path along which no one can go except 
you: whither does it lead? Do not ask, go along it….Your true educators 
and formative teachers reveal to you that the true, original meaning and 
basic stuff of your nature is something completely incapable of being 
educated or formed.…your educators can only be your liberators. (UM 
129) 
 
Real freedom and true wisdom come with this increasing self-awareness and from 1873 
forward, when both PTAG and the Untimely Meditations were written, we begin to hear 
the voice of an increasingly liberated Nietzsche. Liberation for Nietzsche, in contrast to 
Schopenhauer, was not liberation from desire or suffering but liberation from the desire 
to be liberated from these things. By willingly--voluntarily--accepting the random events 
that make up every life as well as the consequences of his own decisions Nietzsche 
became free to seek his own nature and his own path. In The Poet’s Self and the Poem 
(PS) Erich Heller104 cites Schiller’s essay “On Naïve and Reflexive Poetry” writing that 
“Schiller says of all things in Nature that they are what we were . . . but also what we 
ought to become by way of reason and freedom” (PS 46, underline emphasis added). 
                                                 
     103. And he says as much in Ecce Homo “The Untimely Essays” (EH 58): “‘Not 
“Schopenhauer as Educator’ but his opposite, ‘Nietzsche as Educator’.” 
 
     104. Erich Heller (1911 – 1990) Czech-born British essayist on German philosophy 
and literature and author of The Importance of Nietzsche (1988).  
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The Birth of Tragedy  
 The publication of The Birth of Tragedy in 1872 changed Nietzsche’s life forever. 
The first half of the book is a bold and original treatise on the aesthetics and implications 
of Greek tragedy; the second half is a call for a renewal of this aesthetic in terms of the 
music and ideas of Richard Wagner, almost to the point of obsequiousness many of the 
book’s critics felt at the time. (Breazeale, UM ix). Inspired by Schopenhauer and 
stimulated by the Wagners, Nietzsche had blindly left himself open to public ridicule and 
a scornful and vilifying attack by a competitive former fellow philology student at 
Bonn.105  
 The seemingly ‘tragic’ consequences of his first book, however, contributed to 
releasing Nietzsche from all social and professional obligations and allowing him to align 
himself with a commitment to live and continue to think independently and creatively. 
What artist, poet, or true philosopher would not welcome the chance? This was freedom, 
random choice, and fate all at once. 
 Nietzsche must have felt that he was on the right path at last when his own life 
began to reflect Anaxagoras’ theory of the birth of the universe—that sublime moment 
both voluntary and random when a single point begins to turn--the inception of 
movement in the creative void (112). In a sense, Nietzsche stepped outside of causality106 
and aligned himself with the arbitrary will of Nature at this point: 
                                                 
     105. Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff (1848 – 1931) may have been partly 
motivated by professional jealousy. Nietzsche was offered a full professorship at Basle 
when only twenty-five (1869) while Wilamowitz at twenty-five (when he launches his 
attack) is still a student.   
 
     106. Recall that “desire” is shorthand for the Buddhist Twelve Links of Causation, the 
causes of all suffering. See “Buddhism & Nihilism” above (footnote 102).  
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We speak of Nature, and in doing so forget ourselves: we ourselves are 
Nature. (HATH Pt2 II:327 465)  
 
To echo Heller, this is not only to understand and harness natural forces, but to be a 
natural force. Nietzsche has become aware of his own inherent knowledge, his nous--the 
spirit’s intuitive certainty that we can and will find ourselves by looking within, and we 
can and will understand the true nature of life by observing the phenomenal world 
without prejudice.  
 No one can argue that The Birth of Tragedy was not heavily influenced (if not 
somewhat disfigured) by Schopenhauerian views and Wagnerian encouragements. But 
the Greeks were not influenced by Schopenhauer and they viewed tragic drama as an 
educational tool that was entertaining as well as aesthetically pleasing, a combination that 
may be narrowly interpreted as solace.  
 There is a deeper and more enduring theme to BoT that goes far beyond 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy of asceticism and the aesthetic solaces of Wagner’s music. 
For Nietzsche, “the Apolline and its opposite, the Dionysiac, [are] artistic powers which 
erupt from nature itself, without the mediation of any human artist” (19). One might add, 
without the mediation of any other outside influences either. In the Poetics, Aristotle 
refers to tragedy as “‘the imitation of nature’” (BoT 19 fn 34: Poetics 1447a16). I 
maintain that Nietzsche’s underlying theme is always nonduality, the pairing of 
opposites, wholeness, and an unmediated natural source. 
 Nietzsche identifies tragedy with what Heraclitus and Anaxagoras had 
conceptualized as the play of continuous change and renewal in the cosmos. The same 
dynamic balancing that is illustrated in the whirling dance of yin-yang. In BoT it is the 
interplay of Apollonian reason and logic (Yang) with the instinctual desires and emotions 
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of the Dionysian (Yin) that creates great plays. Here, Nietzsche is writing about much 
more than the poetics of Sophoclean107 Greek tragedy. He is also writing about how the 
universe works and how cosmic qualities manifest in the lives of humans as they attempt 
to balance their natural instincts with human reason and science to cultivate the inherent 
faculty of nous, Anaxagoras’ unlimited and self-ruled Mind (and another name perhaps 
for the unnameable Tao).  
 This attempt is nowhere more in evidence than in the creative process—whether 
the creator is Nietzsche or Sophocles--and in the creation: Oedipus of the Theban 
tragedies being a prime example. As Katrin Froese points out, “There can be no self-
creation without also allowing oneself to be created” (93).108 For a true work of art to 
emerge there must be “that mysterious unity” of the Apollonian and the Dionysian (BoT 
28). Nietzsche argues that in order to experience the larger process of life (30) authors as 
well as characters must surrender their individual subjectivity to the Dionysian.  
 In BoT, Nietzsche fully grasps the (Taoist) concepts of inseparability (wholeness), 
the preeminence of the natural, and the inevitability of a return to the source: 
Not only is the bond between human beings renewed by the magic of the 
Dionysiac, but nature, alienated, inimical, or subjugated, celebrates once 
more her festival of reconciliation with her lost son, humankind. (18) 
 
This renewed bond erases the separation of subject and object: “Man is no longer an 
                                                 
     107. Sophocles (497 - 496 BCE) poet and playwright of the Archaic Age (Nietzsche’s 
“tragic age of the Greeks”) whose plays over the course of fifty years for the Dionysian 
festival competitions are the primary subject of The Birth of Tragedy.  
 
     108. Froese’s 2006 book on Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Taoist thought, which I 
discovered late in the writing of this thesis, is knowledgeable and well-articulated but the 
conclusions of our arguments do not agree.  
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artist, he has become a work of art: all nature’s artistic power reveals itself here…” (18).   
 The Greeks accepted such reciprocity between opposites as the norm. The 
imperatives of ‘Know thyself’ and ‘Not too much!’ appear, of course, above the entrance 
to the Temple of Apollo at Delphi where a priestess in a natural gas induced ecstatic state 
offered pronouncements. For the Greeks, the contradictions of contrasting opposites were 
not mutually exclusive. There is always middle ground, there is always a blurring at the 
shadow edge where light meets dark; for the Greeks, as for Taoists, this is where the truth 
lies. 
 For Nietzsche, contemplating the fifty years of the tragic age of Sophocles, the 
universe becomes the stage where inherent order and randomness create and drive the 
action and shape the lives of the characters in what is appropriately called, a play.109   
 Nietzsche’s perfect formula for the best Greek tragedy in BoT is one that requires 
a deeper understanding of the true relationship of opposites to make any sense. It is a 
secret hidden in plain sight: tragedy is something that every human being recognizes 
immediately, innately. It is the push and pull of a desire for wholeness and a 
simultaneous sense of separation from the whole.110 Or it may be the inverse: the sense of 
wholeness and the desire for individuality. The point is, nothing can be left out. 
The metaphysical solace which, I wish to suggest, we derive from every 
true tragedy, the solace that despite all changing appearances, life is 
                                                 
     109.  The dual meaning is the same in German: ein Spiel is “a play,” and “a game.” 
We are reminded here again of Heraclitus.  
 
     110. Aristophanes (446 – c. 386 BCE) in contrast a comedic playwright of the 
Classical Age (480 BCE - 323 BCE) made a bawdy spoof of tragedy reported in Plato’s 
Symposium wherein he concludes that “the desire and pursuit of the Whole is called love” 
referring as well perhaps to Empedocles’ poem On Nature in which Empedocles also 
attributes the push and pull of opposites to the tensions between Love and Strife. 
(Trepanier)  
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indestructibly mighty and pleasurable, [that] appears with palpable clarity 
in the chorus of satyrs, a chorus of natural beings whose life goes on 
ineradicably behind and beyond all civilization, as it were, and who 
remain eternally the same despite all the change of generations and in the 
history of nations. (BoT 39) 
 
This chorus of ‘natural beings’ may as well be a chorus of Taoist sages, observing and 
explaining, helping the audience to both understand and to participate in life more fully, 
singing--to paraphrase wu wei--without changing the action.111   
 In BoT, Nietzsche writes that Socrates “aimed to achieve the disintegration of 
Dionysiac tragedy” (71) and in Twilight of the Idols or How to Philosophize with a 
Hammer, that Socrates needed “to make a tyrant of reason” (I:10 43). He speculates with 
some irony whether Socrates,112 before ending his own life, might have had second 
thoughts and told himself: 
…things which I do not understand are not automatically unreasonable. 
Perhaps there is a kingdom of wisdom from which the logician is 
banished. Perhaps art may even be a necessary correlative and supplement 
of science. (BoT 71) 
 
In Poet’s Self  Heller refers to the “parting of the human mind from Mind” and traces it 
back to Plato’s ideas, “a descent into darkness only dimly illuminated by what little 
transpired of the Idea’s light” (PS 46).113 Indeed, that kingdom of wisdom is where 
Nietzsche wished to live and did live because it was a whole kingdom, not a divided one. 
                                                 
     111. Froese’s definition of wu wei works well here: not the cessation of activity, but 
rather acting in a way that nothingness becomes part of the action (Froese 149).  
     112. Socrates (469-399 BCE) Greek philosopher who developed the dialectic style of 
teaching. He is portrayed in Plato’s Dialogues and also by Xenophon.  
 
     113. Heller also compares the splitting of the mind and the spirit to the Christian 
doctrine of ‘original sin’: the curse described in Genesis when, in defiance of his creator, 
the first man ate from the Tree of Knowledge (PS 46). 
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Like the Greek physikoi Heraclitus and Anaxagoras, he did not fall back in the face of 
paradox as many others had done, say Parmenides or Kant or Schopenhauer.  
 Being whole in a divided world is, at best, an alienating experience and, at worst, 
an annihilating one. Or might it be the other way around? As Nietzsche suggests in BoT 
perhaps it is necessary to annihilate oneself in order to become whole. Was Oedipus 
whole when he was blind to the truth, or did he become whole when he saw the truth and 
blinded himself? Can this image work as a metaphor for what happened to Nietzsche in 
the wake of publishing The Birth of Tragedy?  
 
Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits 
 In the Preface to Part I of Human, All-Too-Human (1878)114 Nietzsche embraces 
the loneliness to which his “difference of outlook” condemned him.115 Perhaps compared 
to Oedipus it did not seem so terrible a punishment. In his subsequent isolation, after 
what he describes as his “great emancipation” he dedicates this book to ‘free spirits’ (7-
8).  By 1879, Nietzsche was too ill to work and had resigned from his professorship at 
Basel with a modest pension. Despite being assailed by illness and real physical suffering 
from agonizing migraines and acute stomach problems, he writes that it is: 
…a radical cure for all pessimism…to become ill…remain ill a good 
while, and then grow well (I mean ‘better’). (11) 
 
                                                 
     114. Bertram notes that the Preface to the first edition of HATH was dedicated to 
Voltaire, “‘one of the greatest liberators of the spirit’” (301). Heller describes the book as 
Nietzsche’s “great experiment in spiritual defiance” (PS 36).  
 
     115. Nietzsche had become a virtual exile, not unlike Socrates and Anaxagoras.  
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Typically for Nietzsche, a step backward represents a running start. He did not merely 
accept and adjust to pain and suffering but came to view their presence in his life 
objectively, even to welcome them and promote their benefits to others. Later in life, in 
the summer of 1887, he will make this note: 
The metaphysicians’ preoccupation with suffering: very naïve. ‘Eternal 
bliss’: psychological nonsense. Brave and creative men never see pleasure 
and suffering as ultimate questions of value—they are accompanying 
states. One must want both to achieve anything. (Writings from the Late 
Notebooks 142; underline emphasis added)116 
 
Suffering, like happiness, is an accompanying state; it is, like every random event in life, 
an opportunity to become wiser, better, more evolved.  
 The man who knows himself better than anyone Freud ever met, now reflects on 
how reversals may in fact be a way forward: 
Cannot all valuations be reversed? And is good perhaps evil? And God 
only an invention and artifice of the devil? Is everything, perhaps, 
radically false? And if we are the deceived, are we not thereby also 
deceivers? (HATH 9) 
  
Indeed, in BGE Nietzsche writes this aphorism: “‘What? Isn’t he going—backwards?’ –
Yes! But you understand him badly if you complain about it. He is going backwards like 
someone who wants to take a great leap—” (Norman, BGE 9:280 169). 
                                                 
     116. There is also famous passage in Will to Power attributed to Nietzsche’s 
notebooks during the same period that reads: “To those human beings who are of any 
concern to me I wish suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities—I wish 
that they should not remain unfamiliar with profound self-contempt, the torture of self-
mistrust, the wretchedness of the vanquished: I have no pity for them, because I wish 
them the only thing that can prove today whether one is worth anything or not—that one 
endures” (WP 910 481). One wonders whether both of these citations are partially a 
response to Schopenhauer’s very different stance on the subject of suffering, i.e. 
something to be avoided at all cost. 
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 In Part II of HATH Nietzsche begins to write aphoristically and to challenge his 
own previous assumptions. A free spirit, Nietzsche will write in Beyond Good and Evil, 
is willing to say “To hell with good taste!” and take on the effort and pain of being an 
outsider, otherwise “he is not made for knowledge” (Norman, BGE 2:26 27). No longer 
under obligation to convention, historicity or dogma, we see a resilient, even an ebullient 
Nietzsche emerge. Not a victim to random circumstance but a man capable of turning 
anything, however random, however cruel as nature can be cruel, into opportunity and 
growth; free now to exercise his will, a volunteer for eternal recurrence. The Judaeo-
Christian “Thy will be done” has metamorphosed to a neutral, universal ‘will be done’--
without the metaphysical ballast.117  
 
Part Three - Beyond Good and Evil (1886) 
 In the Introduction to her translation of Beyond Good and Evil (in German: 
Jenseits von Gut und Böse), Marianne Cowan writes that this is,  
…a book about morality…. At the onset of the twentieth century 
Nietzsche sees humanity at the end of a long experiment with morality. 
We have defined and refined our ideas of good and evil so long 
[Nietzsche] says, that they are all worn out. They slip through our fingers 
and have a disconcerting way of turning into their opposites without 
notice. (Cowan, BGE v) 
 
Cowan elaborates on Nietzsche’s metaphor of an experiment by comparing the scientific 
process to moral process. Cowan observes that in scientific process when “two opposite 
hypotheses meet head-on,” scientists wait for one to be better substantiated than the 
other, or they reformulate the problem or contradiction to be solved from another point of 
                                                 
     117. Thanks to John Hamilton for the term ‘metaphysical ballast.’  
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view (vii). In moral process, on the other hand, philosophers are generally not willing 
either to wait or to reformulate. They feel bound to define absolutes and to overcome or 
ignore any evidence that contradict them. “‘Must we give up morality when our present 
goods and evils fail us?’” asks Nietzsche (vii). 
 In “We scholars” Nietzsche laments yet another oppositional break-up of a 
perfectly matched pair, displaying his “wounds” to “speak out against an inappropriate 
and harmful shift in the rank order between science and philosophy” (Norman, BGE 
6:204 93). This split he argues is an unfortunate departure from the Greek example and 
philosophy has become the poorer for it. He blames “the generalized ill will against all 
philosophy” for alienating young scientists (94). And he envisions a return to wholeness 
with the arrival of a new, free-thinking kind of philosopher who can think both 
scientifically and intuitively—that is, non-dualistically. 
 As a preposition or an adverb in German, jenseit (“beyond”) can mean ‘on the 
other side of’ as well as ‘over and above’ as in across the sea or beyond our dreams or 
imagination. As a proper noun, Jenseit refers to another kind of world entirely, a 
hereafter, in some future time or state. It may be the world Nietzsche describes 
allegorically in Zarathustra: A Book for All and None (1883-1885), the philosophical 
novel that Nietzsche considered his masterpiece, his attempt to describe the evolutionary 
journey of this “new species of philosopher coming up over the horizon” (Cowan, BGE 
2:42 48) and whom he often refers to as a superior kind of human being in the same 
way—to my mind—that the I Ching often refers to those who are wise and enlightened in 
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their approach to living and thinking.118 In Zarathustra and in all of his subsequent 
works, Nietzsche insists on nothing less than an evolutionary change, an advanced state 
of being and consciousness that leaves dualistic thinking behind and lives with an innate 
sense of how to live morally without absolutes, of how to weather change and uncertainty 
without fear, to welcome the experience of suffering for the wisdom it will bring, and to 
embrace the comfort of the void (a distinctly tao-chia comfort).  
 In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche envisions and then coins a new name for this 
new species of “free, very free thinkers” who are “not merely free thinkers but something 
more, something superior, greater, and thoroughly different, something that does not 
want to be misjudged or mistaken for something else” (Cowan, BGE 2:44 49). He 
combines the verb “to seek” (suchen) with the prefix ver to dub the new philosophers 
Versucher:  “experimenters” (48).119  Such a word might include not only philosophers 
and scientists, but poet/philosophers and, for that matter, why not anyone else engaged in 
the ‘experiment’ of living? 
 The way of the new philosopher cannot be taught, it can only be learned through 
experience. It is intuitive; its “tempo is presto;” it combines “exuberant spiritedness” with 
“dialectical rigor and necessity which never makes a misstep” (Cowan, BGE 6:213 138). 
                                                 
     118. The “superior man” or the “great man” is a familiar figure in the Taoist oracular 
text of the I Ching, and represents a man who lives in harmony with the Tao, acting 
spontaneously out of a state of inner calm. These traits define the quintessential qualities 
of an individual who follows the Taoist way of life. 
 
      119. There is a hidden pun in the coinage that Nietzsche uses implicitly here and 
explicitly elsewhere (Cowan, BGE 2:42 48 fn2). Horstmann notes that, “Nietzsche uses 
the German word Versuch (attempt, experiment) in a broad way which makes that term 
cover the connotations of Versuchung (temptation) and Versucher (tempter) as well” 
(Horstmann 189 fn18). 
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Nietzsche suggests that artists may have the advantage as Versucher: 
They know only too well that only when they do nothing ‘willfully’ and 
everything ‘of necessity” does their feeling of freedom, subtlety, full 
powers, of creatively placing, disposing, and forming, reach its height. In 
short, that necessity and ‘freedom of the will’ are one and the same when 
they create. (138) 
 
Has Nietzsche just given us another way to define Taoist wu wei?  
 Versucher, just like experimenters in the sciences, must also be willing to 
question every conventional assumption: 
…first, whether opposites even exist and, second, whether the popular 
valuations and value oppositions that have earned the metaphysicians’ seal 
of approval might not only be…provisional perspectives. (Norman, BGE 
1:2 6) 
 
…and risk the provisional aspects of the world of appearances: 
 
It could be possible that appearance, the will to deception, and craven self-
interest should be accorded a higher and more fundamental value for all 
life. It could even be possible that whatever gives value to those good and 
honorable things has an incriminating link, bond, or tie to the very things 
that look like their evil opposites; perhaps they are even essentially the 
same. Perhaps! – But who is willing to take charge of such a dangerous 
Perhaps! For this we must await the arrival of a new breed of 
philosophers, ones whose taste and inclination are somehow the reverse of 
those we have seen so far—philosophers of the dangerous Perhaps in 
every sense. – And in all seriousness, I see these new philosophers 
approaching. (6) 
 
The danger is all in the ‘perhaps,’ in German zufällig, which is also the word  for 
‘random’; for philosophers of the dangerous, there are no certainties—there are only 
random chance, free choice, and the courage to act intuitively.  
 Nietzsche uses strong language to describe life as a “real philosopher”: 
To the rabble, wisdom seems like a kind of escape, a device or trick for 
pulling yourself out of the game when things get rough. But the real 
philosopher lives ‘unphilosophically,’ ‘unwisely,’ in a manner which is 
above all not clever, and feels the weight and duty of a hundred 
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experiments and temptations of life: -- he constantly puts himself at risk, 
he plays the rough game (Norman, BGE 6:205 96) 
 
“You have to be tough to follow Tao…” (Deng, 365 Tao 57). 
 
Nietzsche’s Philosopher of the Future: Physikoi 
 Whitlock reminds us that at the University of Bonn Nietzsche faced a “tortured 
decision” between the sciences—particularly atomism and chemistry—and philology. He 
settled on the latter, sponsored by his teacher and sponsor Friedrich Ritschl, who helped 
launch him into a professorship in philology at the University of Basel in 1869 (Whitlock 
xxxvi-xxxvii).  
 “We are but atoms”120 Nietzsche writes in his inaugural address at the University 
of Basel on May 28th 1869, after he had opted for philology over science knowing full 
well that his lectures on the “pre-Platonics” would be replete with science (Nietzsche, 
Complete Works Vol. 3 169). For Nietzsche the materialist atomist view (associated with 
Empedocles and Democritus and later developed by Epicurus121 and then Lucretius) 
always represented a far more palatable version of cosmology than any kind of abstract 
spiritualism: an ever-present void where he could thrive as a being created and creating 
until his atoms parted and returned to their source to begin again.  
                                                 
     120. “We demand thanks—not in our own name, for we are but atoms—but in the 
name of philology itself, which is indeed neither a Muse nor a Grace, but a messenger of 
the gods.” He closes with “By this I wish to signify that all philological activities should 
be enclosed and surrounded by a philosophical view of things, in which everything 
individual and isolated is evaporated as something detestable, and in which great 
homogeneous views alone remain.” (Nietzsche, Complete Works Vol 3. 169.)  
 
     121. Epicurus, whose work exists only in fragments and second-hand accounts, 
insisted that the mind was an organ in the body, and that when the body disintegrated so 
did the mind. The atoms are eternal, says Epicurus, but the mind like the body is not. 
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 In notebook entries during the summer of 1872 and winter of 1873, Nietzsche 
writes about the philosopher’s nature and the philosopher of the future: 
The philosopher alongside the man of science and the artist.  
Restraining the drive for knowledge by means of art, the religious drive 
for oneness by means of the concept. 
The strange juxtaposition of conception and abstraction 
Significance for culture. 
Metaphysis as vacuum. (Early Notebooks 19[72] 115) 
 
This becomes a never-ending theme for Nietzsche who, like philosophical Taoists and 
some Presocratics, came to see the everyday phenomenal world not in opposition to the 
metaphysical world but as a link to it, translated into a language the senses can 
comprehend. Ballast for one another, in a creative void. 
 In Nietzsche and the Philology of the Future James Porter sees in atomistic theory 
not only an account of how nature works but also “an account of ourselves” (89). Indeed, 
Porter seems to make nearly the same claims for Nietzsche’s interest in Democritus122 
and atomism as I make for Nietzsche and Taoist concepts.   
Nietzsche’s rediscovery of Greek atomism is of the greatest moment. His 
completion of Democritus’ project, which involved rounding out the 
missing contours and absorbing atomistic thinking into his own his own 
evolving perspectives, would affect all his future undertakings… (82)123 
 
                                                 
     122. Democritus (c. 460 – c. 360 BCE) born in Thrace (modern day Bulgaria), was an 
extensive traveler with impressive knowledge gleaned from the great centers of learning 
in the ancient world about natural phenomena. He formulated an atomic theory of the 
universe based on the ideas of his teacher, Leucippus. Diogenes Laertius quotes 
Democritus as saying, “I came to Athens and nobody knew me”—but reports that Plato 
knew enough about him to wish all of his books burned. 
 
     123. Brobjer notes that Nietzsche’s interest shifted from Democritus to Heraclitus in 
1869 (57); Porter’s assessment of Nietzsche’s notes for his Pre-platonic lectures at the 
University of Basel “presuppose a thorough familiarity with the physical theory of 
Democritus” (Porter 85). 
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Citing from Nietzsche’s notes and HATH, Porter writes that “in Nietzsche’s eyes: 
‘Democritus [is] in a battle with his times’; he is one of the ‘forerunners of a reformation 
of the Greeks’” (91, fn23). Nietzsche in his own ‘un-timeliness’ was also embattled.  
 Arguments about randomness and will, positivism and nihilism, materialism and 
spiritualism will abound as long as there are minds to puzzle over these issues. Consider 
theoretical astrophysicist Robert O. Doyle124 who observes in Free Will: The Scandal in 
Philosophy (2011) that the term “free will” is misleading: “The will itself is indeed not 
‘free’ (in the sense of uncaused), but we are free” (28). Doyle points out that the element 
of randomness doesn’t make us random, it simply affords our will the freedom to choose 
from among an array of thoughts and actions. Doyle concludes: “Chance only generates 
alternative possibilities for thought and action . . . [w]e are free, in control, and morally 
responsible for our choices and actions” (29). Free will is a combination of random 
elements and free choice, just as implied by the Presocratics and Taoist thought.  
 What seems perfectly clear is that the application of the natural science of 
physical phenomena to human concerns was something that Nietzsche always searched 
for, experimented with, and was tempted by--not so much a search for meaning as an 
explanation of the universe that his keen, creative, scientific mind could accept, even if it 
sometimes required a leap of creative intuition. What drew Nietzsche to Democritus’ 
atomic theory, Porter continues,  
. . . is the space it affords to collision and opposition, its flouting of 
commonplace intuitions and of popular and philosophical beliefs, and its 
assault on the very structures of representation. In all of this N. detects 
                                                 
     124. Doyle, with a Ph.D in astrophysics at Harvard and an associate in the department 
of astronomy, refers to himself as an “Information Philosopher – beyond logic and 
language.” We might refer to him as a twenty-first century physikoi, a Nietzschean 
thinker, or a Taoist. Or we might reject labels. 
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what he calls the dichterischer Schwung, “poetic abandon” with which 
Democritus retails the story of mankind’s irretrievable fragility (Porter 83-
84). 
 
Poetic abandon sounds a great deal like Dionysus in BoT, a way perhaps of reaching 
through the chaos of the void to find beauty, and make sense out of the inevitable human 
tragedies of human life. (Why do humans believe they must only be happy?) 
 Throughout his life Nietzsche was invigorated by the dynamism and apparent 
conflict he saw in his own life and in the world around him. All of his work arose out of 
this chaos and from the emptiness he saw behind it. In an early essay written in 1864 
while still a student, Nietzsche observes: 
Conflict is the constant nourishment of the soul and the soul knows how to 
extract from it much that is sweet and fine. The soul destroys and thereby 
gives birth to new things, it fights energetically and yet gently draws the 
opponent over to its own side for an intimate union. (Ansell-Pearson, 
Nietzsche Reader “On Moods” 22) 
 
Once again we see Nietzsche’s confluence with yet another pre-Socratic philosopher/poet 
far removed from him in time and space, Empedocles,125 who writes in verse in On 
Nature that the conflict between Love and Strife is at the heart of an endlessly repeating 
cosmic cycle. (Which is yin and which yang in this formula?—we can take our pick.)  
 “There’s a paradox at the heart of our understanding of the physical world” Carlo 
Rovelli writes in Seven Brief Lessons on Physics. He then describes two theories that are 
each not merely adequate but remarkably and convincingly comprehensive: two separate 
and equal theories that appear to refute and oppose each other (41).  
                                                 
     125. Empedocles (c.490 – c. 430 BCE) author of On Nature that anticipates the later 
development of atomic theory by Democritus and who wrote in verse as Lucretius does 
later, in De Rarum Natura. 
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 The first theory is the theory of general relativity in which the universe is a curved 
space, continuous and dynamic, and moved by waves “similar to those of the sea, 
sometimes so agitated as to create the gaps that are black holes” (29):  
. . . a kind of immense, mobile snail shell in which we are contained—one 
that can be compressed and twisted. (42-43) 
 
Rovelli’s imagery recalls Anaxagoras’ spiraling movement; or the spinning of the twin 
helixes around a central void that Laozi describes in the Tao te Ching. Astrophysics, 
gravitational waves, black holes, and much more developed out of the theory of general 
relativity (39).126 
 The second theory is particle or quantum physics in which there is also motion but 
in a space that is neither continuous nor infinitely divisible but made up of particles “a 
billion billion times smaller than the smallest atomic nuclei” (43). In quantum theory 
there is no real void, no complete emptiness but a space that “just as the calmest 
sea…sways and trembles,” in which particles continually come to be and pass away in 
response to that constant motion (33). 
 In effect, the conflict between these two theories poses the same duality that 
Presocratics wrestled with—how to reconcile a singular, unified source that gives rise to 
and encompasses infinite variety? Modern physicists, like the first philosophers Rovelli 
points out, delight in contradictory theories: “A physicist is only too happy when s/he 
finds a conflict between successful theories” as it represents “an extraordinary 
                                                 
     126. Werner Heisenberg (1901 – 1976), pioneering German theoretic physicist, 
claimed that the central ideas of his quantum theory were inspired by a close reading of 
Plato’s Timaeus in which Plato explains that order and beauty in the universe is the 
handiwork of a divine dêmiourgos, a rational, purposive, and beneficent being 
responsible for its creation. (Zeyl, "Plato's Timaeus," The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition).  
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opportunity” (41).  
 The current opportunity is called “loop quantum gravity” in which the quanta of 
physical space are linked to one another, 
like the rings of a finely woven, immense chain mail. Where are these 
quanta of space? Nowhere. They are not in space because they are 
themselves the space. Space is created by the linking of these individual 
quanta of gravity. (43) 
  
In loop quantum theory, both time and space disappear but “change is ubiquitous”: 
At the minute scale of the grains of space, the dance of nature does not 
take place to the rhythm of the baton of a single conductor, at a single 
tempo: every process dances independently with its neighbors, to its own 
rhythm. The passage of time is internal to the world, is born in the world 
itself in the relationship between quantum events that comprise the world 
and are themselves the source of time. (44) 
 
The universe: free and random, and also linked. Rovelli’s brief exposition of 
contemporary physics suggests that freeing ourselves from dualistic thinking and seeking 
a perspective from the middle of an apparent contradiction, may give us the best view of 
reality.   
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Chapter V 
 
 Speech & Silence 
 
This is my way, what is yours? 
~ Nietzsche, Zarathustra Part 3:55 “The Spirit of Gravity” 
 
We need speaking and words, and we need to perceive the constant Tao 
that has no description for its eternal character. We cannot discard either 
side of the equation. 
~ Deng, Lunar Tao 53 
 
 Taoists say that the best perspective is from the middle. With this in mind, I stand 
on an island in the middle of the river of time--this moment--and turn around in a circle 
to look: at Taoist thought as it originated in ancient China, at the Presocratic Greeks in 
the sixth and fifth centuries BCE, at Nietzsche in the long nineteenth century that began 
with the Enlightenment in Europe, and back to where we find ourselves today. From this 
perspective, the past, the present, and the future are joined like the headwater, channel, 
and mouth of river; they cannot be divided (Deng, 365 Tao 15). 
 This indivisibility has guided my attempt to write about subjects that mostly resist 
certainty, language, or even understanding except intuitively. These are the qualities that 
characterize Nietzsche, Taoist philosophy, and, only partly because of their fragmentary 
nature, the Presocratics. My thesis hews to the positive side of Nietzsche—his positive 
view of the emptiness behind everything, of randomness and uncertainty, of the will to 
life and the intense suffering and joy that accompany living. One might call this his 
profoundly superficial side, as he said of the Greeks in the Preface to The Gay Science (or 
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The Joyful Science—Die fröhliche Wissenschaft): “Those Greeks, superficial—from 
profundity!” (8)  
 
Speech: Language & Truth 
 Because we equate it with fact and with science, perhaps we invest127 too much 
value in the idea of truthfulness, expecting the same graven words throughout time 
instead of relying on what is not fixed, our intuition in the moment. As Deng says, “You 
could tell the secret of life ten times over, and it would still be safe” (365 Tao 286). How, 
then, are we to live, to know right from wrong, to keep our sanity in this constant flux? 
How are we to understand our world and our universe and our place in it not as a thing 
apart but as a part of it? The perceiver as well as the perceived? These are the questions 
Nietzsche poses in “On the Prejudices of Philosophers”:  
. . . that we should finally learn from this Sphinx to ask questions, too? 
Who is it really that puts questions to us here? What in us really wants 
‘truth’? 
 
   Indeed we came to a long halt at the question about the cause of this 
will—until we finally came to a complete stop before a still more basic 
question. We asked about the value of this will. Suppose we want truth: 
why not rather untruth? And uncertainty? Even ignorance? 
 
   The problem of the value of truth came before us—or was it we who 
came before the problem? Who of us is Oedipus here? Who the Sphinx? 
(Kaufmann, Basic Writings BGE 1:1 199) 
 
Add to these, another: will we understand the answers when we hear them?  
 Nietzsche, the Presocratics, and those who follow Taoist philosophy all arrive at 
answers by observation, personal experience, and creative intuition—this last variously 
                                                 
     127. From investire (Latin): to clothe. Indeed, like the twins that they are, we do dress 
up the truth just as we do an untruth, usually to suit our own ends. 
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dubbed the eternal Tao (unnameable and unspoken, it should be noted), the “Will”, or 
nous. All these conventions (topoi in Greek) invariably accompanied by their opposites: 
the tao that can be spoken, the random, unwilled nature of the cosmos, and the logic of 
logos, respectively. 
 One of the great shortcomings of logos is language itself. Our thoughts make the 
world but how do we articulate and then interpret these thoughts? We know our thoughts 
intuitively but most of the time what motivates our actions is language.  Language is not 
truth but a tool we use to point at the truth, like the Sphinx’s riddle. More than a mere 
designator, in the hands of a poet or an intuitive thinker like Nietzsche, language 
possesses a revelatory quality that can disclose the truth both to the author128 and the 
audience.   
 Nietzsche understood and appreciated the poetry of the scientific theory of the 
cosmos presented in fragments by the Presocratic atomists and physikoi; and he would 
have understood Taoist cosmology in the same way. Poetry, the Taoists say, lodges in the 
same part of the brain as Tao. Only in poetry does language become intuitive and 
therefore a more reliable source for true action, which Taoists call wu wei. Willful, 
arbitrary, random, and in perfect harmony with a cosmos that has no goal other than to 
act according to its nature. The tension and variance between opposites—what Heraclitus 
considered a ‘game’ and that Anaxagoras developed into scientific theory—is what 
animates us as well; it is the preeminent quality of life itself. 
                                                 
     128. From the Latin augeo: to increase and originate. Certainly Nietzsche increased and 
originated a great deal with his use of language. 
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 No one reading and writing about Nietzsche can fail to realize that whatever 
position one takes can be supported by a selection from his works, published and 
unpublished. For a vivid example of the unreliability of language and meaning, we need 
look no further than the posthumous publication of The Will to Power (1908), a book 
selectively compiled by Nietzsche’s sister Elizabeth Nietzsche-Förster from his 
unpublished notebooks. Among its many incomprehensibilities is the misrepresentation 
of Nietzsche’s view of the will to life as Schopenhauer’s “will to power.”   
 Think about how window glass distorts an image even as it provides the means 
for looking at an image; or how a mirror provides a reverse image of the self. Even the 
eye sees things upside down.129 This is the difference between ontology--knowing how 
things really are--and epistemology: how we perceive things through the filters of our 
cognition (logos). In the same way, it is difficult—if not impossible--to put mental or 
spiritual concepts like nous or tao into words, and the more words we use the more 
obscure the original insight becomes. “The text has finally disappeared under the 
interpretation,” Nietzsche writes in Beyond Good and Evil (Norman, BGE 2:38 37).  
 Nietzsche understood all of this, intuitively and from experience, knew this 
perhaps both in his reasoning lifetime and his mute lifetime… He certainly knew it in 
1873 when he wrote “On Truth and Lie in an Extra Moral Sense” an essay on the nature 
of truth and language arguing that truth and the concepts that try to convey it are: 
A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms—in 
short, a sum of human relations which have been enhanced, transposed, 
and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem 
firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about 
                                                 
     129. The images we see with the cornea are made up of light reflected from the 
objects we see; because the cornea is curved, it bends the light, creating an upside down 
image on the retina that is then put right by the brain.  
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which one has forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors which are 
worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures 
and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins. (Kaufmann, Portable 
Nietzsche 46-47) 
 
In his attempt to foil its inherent limitations,130 Nietzsche uses language creatively and in 
every style and genre—essay, fiction, verse, polemic, aphorism, parable--to surprise the 
reader with a burst of felt meaning, not unlike the effect of music in the ear.131 The short 
form aphorisms and maxims for which he is well-known may also have developed out of 
expediency so that he could work despite his impaired eyesight and severe headaches.  
 It is not only thinking dualistically but language itself that is the ‘author’ of 
myriad misapprehensions. Deng writes in Scholar Warrior: 
The ultimate nature of Tao itself is not possible for us to grasp because our 
minds are inherently dualistic. We are children of beauty and ugliness; we 
dwell in the midst of the nameable, we gravitate toward what we can 
identify. The Tao, however, is both nameless (no being) and named 
(being). Within the depths of Tao, existence and nonexistence come 
together; no distinctions exist. Time becomes circular and even irrelevant. 
Our minds cannot function in such a realm… (181) 
 
It seems that Nietzsche’s mind could and did function in such a realm.    
 Nietzsche is as careful with language as a sailor is wary of the sea.132 One could 
say (and he did say more than once) that he would rather not be understood at all than to 
                                                 
     130. Another great irony in Nietzsche’s journey is that much as Oedipus’ attempt to 
thwart the Delphic Oracle’s prophecy lead him to actions that fulfill the prophecy, 
Nietzsche’s attempts to avoid being understood by the ‘wrong’ people through the 
enigmatic nature of his work became, after his death, a tool for others to achieve an 
entirely ‘antipodal’ result.   
 
     131. Jacques Derrida the great postmodern deconstructionist devotes a book to the 
topic of Nietzsche’s writing styles, Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles. See Works Consulted.  
 
     132. In Shipwreck with Spectator Hans Blumenberg calls the “sea-faring metaphor” 
for life “a model open to multiple possible actualizations” (2). This is the case for 
language as well. Nietzsche uses the metaphor of the sea in Gay Science when his 
“madman” laments the death of God wondering how it was possible to swallow the sea—
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be misunderstood. Through the use of brevity, ambivalence, and frequent contradiction 
Nietzsche attempts to circumvent the limitations of language, often successfully. He 
devises ways to get around those limitations in order to encompass a whole, non-dualistic 
reality that would encompass all contradictions. “I obviously do everything to be ‘hard to 
understand’ myself,” Nietzsche writes in “The free spirit” (Norman, BGE 2:27 28).  
Every philosophy conceals a philosophy too: every opinion is also a 
hiding place, every word is also a mask…. Every profound thinker is more 
afraid of being understood than of being misunderstood. (“What is noble?” 
9:289-290 173) 
 
Clearly doubting the ability of language to be up to the task of communicating the 
ineffable, Nietzsche expresses disdain for “things that let themselves be written”: 
—what are the only things we can paint? Oh, only ever things that are 
about to wilt and lose their smell! Only ever storms that have exhausted 
themselves and are moving off, and feelings that are yellowed and late! 
…We only immortalize things that cannot live and fly for much longer, 
only tired and worn-out things! (9:296 177) 
 
Such observations on the limitations and expediencies of language resonate markedly 
with Taoist philosophy. J.J. Clarke says in The Tao of the West that Taoist texts play with 
the unreliable, mediated nature of language to communicate the opposite of the meaning 
of their words; other times what is written or said is contained in what is not said or 
written, or only by inference or implication. All of this to “deliberately thwart attempts to 
pin down their teaching” (17-18).   
                                                 
a miraculous impossibility (79). Then Nietzsche describes the world after God’s death as 
an ‘open sea,’ open as never before, a horizon of the infinite (131)--very reminiscent of 
the Taoist creative void and the Presocratics’ unlimited nous. “Tao may be known as 
directly as water is knowable to a fish” writes Deng (365 Tao 319). The sea also figures 
in the soteric imagery of both Theraveda (rafts) and Mahayana (a ship) Buddhism. 
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 There is an extraordinary verse in the Tao te Ching attributed to Laozi in the fifth 
century BCE that captures in an uncanny way the spirit and reality of Nietzsche’s life and 
work and times:  
Between ‘definitely’ and ‘probably’: 
what difference is there? 
Between ‘good’ and ‘evil’: 
what difference is there? 
What men honour one must honour. 
O loneliness, how long will you last? 
All men are so shining-bright 
as if they were going to the great sacrificial feast, 
as if they were climbing up the towers in spring. 
Only I am so reluctant, I have not yet been given a sign: 
like an infant, yet unable to laugh; 
unquiet, roving as if I had no home. 
All men have abundance, 
only I am as if forgotten. 
I have the heart of a fool: so confused, so dark. 
Men of the world are so clever, alas, so clever; 
only I am as if locked into myself, 
unquiet, alas, like the sea, 
turbulent, alas, unceasingly. 
All men have their purpose, 
only I am futile like a beggar. 
I alone am different from all men: 
But I consider it worthy 
to seek nourishment from the Mother.  
(Laozi #20 Wilhelm trans. 35, emphasis added) 
 
In its specificity, this verse could almost be one of Nietzsche’s philosophical poems 
describing his own life and experience, yet with the quality of having been written 
retrospectively, after his own death and from a perspective not entirely his alone, and not 
only of this world--a timeless and untimely perspective. 
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Silence: The Soul Wearies 
 Let us end with the apocryphal tale that in Turin in 1889, when Nietzsche is said 
to have witnessed a man beating a horse that has collapsed on the street. It was reported 
that Nietzsche ran up to the horse and attempted to shield the animal from the blows 
raining down upon it by clasping it around the neck with his arms. This traumatic event 
has been posited as signaling the beginning of a complete breakdown and the end of 
Nietzsche’s working life. In a 2011 film, The Turin Horse, filmmaker Béla Tarr begins 
with this introductory intertitle: 
In Turin on 3rd January, 1889, Friedrich Nietzsche steps out of the doorway of 
number six, Via Carlo Alberto. Not far from him, the driver of a hansom cab is 
having trouble with a stubborn horse. Despite all his urging, the horse refuses to 
move, whereupon the driver loses his patience and takes his whip to it. Nietzsche 
comes up to the throng and puts an end to the brutal scene, throwing his arms 
around the horse’s neck, sobbing. His landlord takes him home, he lies motionless 
and silent for two days on a divan until he mutters the obligatory last words, 
'Mutter, ich bin dumm!'133 And lives for another ten years, silent and demented, 
cared for by his mother and sister. We do not know what happened to the horse. 
(Petkovic) 
 
Tarr’s film is entirely about the horse and its owner after these events, sidestepping the 
issue of historical veracity and taking it directly from his own imagination: Why not 
‘untruth’ instead?  
 Scholars generally dismiss the story of the horse of Turin as a sentimentalized or 
mythologized version of events, but what is truly remarkable about the story that is told 
of what happened to Nietzsche in Turin—true or not-- is that it describes a spontaneous 
act, effortlessly correct, unintentional without desire or motive, in such a way as Froese 
puts it so well, that ‘nothingness becomes part of the action.’ It illustrates the congruence 
                                                 
     133. “Mother, I am dumb!” meaning “mute.” 
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I have attempted to show in this thesis between Nietzsche’s spirit and the quality of 
someone who follows Taoism: that to be truly alive in the world, one must knowingly 
respond to every opportunity to act and conform to every situation, from the mind and 
from the spirit. 
 From a Taoist perspective, seeing the horse being beaten may have simply 
impelled Nietzsche to act without thinking; or, he may have identified with the horse and 
moved to defend it as himself. It is a Taoist practice to learn from watching animals. 
Deng describes the practice of meditation as “a cat sitting motionless in the sun or a turtle 
who stretches her head upward in a still pose.” Animals know how “to be still and…not 
dissipate themselves in useless activity but instead withdraw into themselves to recharge” 
(365 Tao 294).  
 Cowan tells us that Nietzsche once wrote in a letter “that everything he ever wrote 
came to life for him only after the final dash—everything before it was merely scenery” 
(BGE Cowan, ix). She illustrates the point with this citation from Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
Part 3:46 “The Vision and the Riddle”: 
 To you alone, you bold seekers, tempters, experimenters, and to all 
who ever went out on the terrible sea with cunning sails— 
 To you alone, who are riddle-drunk and twilight-happy, whose 
souls are lured by flutes to any treacherous chasm— 
 To you who do not like to grope for a clue with cowardly hands 
and who prefer not to deduce where you can intuit— 
 To you alone I shall tell the riddle that I saw…. (ix-x) 
 
We don’t know what really happened that January day in Turin in 1889—the text, if one 
ever existed, has surely gotten lost in the interpretation. Neurological explanations aside, 
Nietzsche’s spirit may have simply withdrawn, become still, and returned, speechless, to 
his source, his mother Franziska: “Mother, I am dumb!” Like a Taoist, perhaps he knew 
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that those who know do not speak and those who speak do not know (Wilhelm, Laozi #56 
52). He surely knew that as soon as the soul speaks, it is not the soul that speaks.134  
 Perhaps his soul finally wearied of the task of explaining itself.  
  
  
                                                 
     134. Spricht die Seele, so spricht ach! schon die Seele nicht mehr. (Schiller) 
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Appendix I 
from Chapter II “What is Tao?”  
 
1. Taijitu or Yin-Yang Symbol, meant to convey the notion that all apparent 
opposites are complementary parts of a non-dual whole.  
 
 
 
2. Ensō (c. 2000) by Kanjuro Shibata XX. Some artists draw ensō with an opening 
in the circle, while others close the circle. 
 
 
3. First Day of Creation – Note that a large hand, presumably of “God” is poised 
outside the circle, perhaps to give it its first spin. 
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4. The World in the Body from the Neijing Tu. 
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Appendix II  
 from Chapter III “The Presocratics” 
 
1. Aóristos: the grammar of Greek wholeness 
 In early Greek grammar, there originally existed a “middle voice”--the aóristos or 
Greek “indefinite” is “a class of verb forms that generally portrays a situation as simple 
or undefined, that is, as having perfective aspect.”135 The indefinite tense removes 
polarity and expands meaning to include both object and subject. It is an intuitive voice, 
based on context, perspective, and awareness. Among other things, the middle voice is 
used for “undivided events” such as timelessness—single future, present, and past events, 
repeated. Kitto notes that the Greek word for wholeness, sôphrosynê--literally ‘whole-
mindedness’ or ‘unimpaired-mindedness,’ meaning ‘wisdom,’ ‘prudence,’ 
temperateness,’ ‘chastity,’ ‘sobriety,’’ ‘modesty,’ or ‘self-control’—is, in fact 
untranslatable because it is not one thing or another, nor even an intermediate thing. 
Rather, it is all at the same time: “something entirely intellectual,”  “something entirely 
moral,” and, as well, “something intermediate” (Kitto 171). No modern language today 
has a middle voice.  
 The indefinite describes an action “pure and simple.” One might say, the action 
itself and not the act of the action. In Taoism, “those who attain the middle dominate the 
whole” Deng, 365 Tao 183). 
  
                                                 
     135. The aoristic aspect is a grammatical aspect used to describe an action viewed as a 
simple whole—a unit without interior composition. Source: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aorist_(Ancient_Greek) 
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2. Laozi #14 (Lin translation) 
In Taoist thought movement away from Tao and back to Tao is called the “Tao Axiom of 
Return” or simply, “Origins:” 
 
Look at it, it cannot be seen 
It is called colorless 
Listen to it, it cannot be heard 
It is called noiseless 
Reach for it, it cannot be held 
It is called formless 
These three cannot be completely unraveled 
So they are combined into one 
Above it, not bright 
Below it, not dark 
Continuing endlessly, cannot be named 
It returns back into nothingness 
Thus it is called the form of the formless 
The image of the imageless 
This is called enigmatic 
Confront it, its front cannot be seen 
Follow it, its back cannot be seen 
Wield the Tao of the ancients 
To manage the existence of today 
One can know the ancient beginning 
It is called the Tao Axiom 
  
3. “Walking and Falling” lyrics by Laurie Anderson 
I wanted you. And I was looking for you. 
But I couldn't find you. 
I wanted you. And I was looking for you all day. 
But I couldn't find you. I couldn't find you. 
 
You're walking. And you don't always realize it, 
but you're always falling. 
With each step, you fall forward slightly. 
And then catch yourself from falling. 
Over and over, you're falling. 
And then catching yourself from falling. 
And this is how you can be walking and falling at the same time.  
(Big Science) 
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4. Laozi #25 (Wilhelm translation) 
There is one thing that is invariably complete. 
Before Heaven and Earth were, it is already there: 
so still, so lonely. 
Alone it stands and dos not change. 
It turns in a circle and does not endanger itself. 
One may call it ‘the Mother of the World’. 
I do not know its name. 
I call it DAO. 
Painfully giving it a name 
I call it ‘great’. 
Great: that means ‘always in motion’. 
‘Always in motion’ means ‘far away’. 
‘Far away means ‘returning’. 
Thus DAO is great, Heaven is great, Earth is great, 
and Man too is great. 
There are in space four Great Ones, 
and Man is one of them. 
Man conforms to Earth. 
Earth conforms to Heaven. 
Heaven conforms to DAO. 
DAO conforms to itself. 
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5. The Parable of the Elephant 
The parable of the blind men and an elephant originated in the Theravadan Buddhist 
tradition, as preserved in the Pāli language (Sanskirt) in India. Sometimes there are six 
blind sages and sometimes three. Sometimes they are not blind, but simply in the dark 
and unable to see the entire elephant. The Sufi master Jalal’ud-din Rumi (1207-1273) 
made the fable famous in his poetic collection, the Mathnawi, Book III, Story V: 
Once there was a poor Persian village where all were blind. One day a 
strange new creature called an elephant appeared at the village wall. Since 
no one in the village had ever heard of an elephant, the three wisest of the 
blind villagers went out to discover what the new creature was like. They 
all felt the creature. The first blind sage felt the tail and said, ‘This creature 
cannot be an elephant, this is a rope!’ The second blind sage felt the leg 
and said, ‘No, this is a tree!’ The third blind sage felt the side and said, 
‘No, you fools, this is a wall!’  
 
In some versions of the ending, a sighted man or a king informs them of their error; or 
another blind man, who is not a sage, realizes he can mount the elephant and simply rides 
away.  
http://www.mythfolklore.net/3043mythfolklore/reading/rumi/pages/01.htm Accessed 31 
March 2017 
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Appendix III  
from Chapter IV “Shared Perspectives” 
 
1. Aristophanes’ Speech from Plato’s Symposium 
 Aristophanes (c. 446 – c. 386 BCE) was a poet, playwright, and jokester who 
liked to poke fun at convention, at the prominent, and even at the gods, all under the 
cloak of entertainment. He made brilliant use of a trope of Greek drama, εἰρωνεία 
(eirōneía), or irony, which was a way of saying or showing one thing but meaning its 
opposite. 
 In this speech, recounted in Plato’s Symposium, Aristophanes describes primeval 
humankind: 
The original human nature was not like the present, but 
different…there was man, woman, and the union of the 
two, of which the name survives but nothing else. Once it 
was a distinct kind, with a bodily shape and a name of its 
own, constituted by the union of the male and the female: 
but now only the word 'androgynous' is preserved, and that 
as a term of reproach. (Jowett, Collected Works of Plato 
520) 
 
Aristophanes pretends in his speech to refer to sex and gender—always good for a laugh 
in the theater--and describes a peculiar and someone repulsive roundish beast with two 
backs, the sexual organs of both male and female, as well as four arms and four legs--able 
to walk upright, both backwards or forwards and, terrifyingly, able to roll and turn at 
enormous speed. 
Terrible was their might and strength, and the thoughts of 
their hearts were great, and they made an attack upon the 
gods; of them is told the tale of Otys and Ephialtes who, as 
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Homer136 says, attempted to scale heaven, and would have 
laid hands upon the gods. (520) 
 
The gods felt so threatened by this uniquely endowed, united, and intelligent human beast 
that they considered annihilating the new race entirely. It was Zeus who came up with an 
elegant way to neutralize mankind’s power: split the beast in two and it would no longer 
be able to compete with the gods. And so, mankind was cut down to size and split not 
only into two sexual halves but split internally as well, filled with doubt, contradiction, 
fear, envy, lust, and absent a natural ability to temper greed with generosity, aggression 
with peaceful acceptance, and so forth. Instead, these traits would forever reside in the 
human spirit in unequal measures, dividing rather than uniting. (Collected Works 
Sections 189c-193e pages 520-525) 
  
                                                 
     136. Homer (circa 8th – 7th c. BCE) to whom the epic poems the Iliad and the 
Odyssey are attributed. 
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Glossary of Greek and Chinese Terms 
 
wu wei (Chinese) – acting without acting, that is spontaneous action in harmony with the 
essence of human and cosmic creativity and the result of understanding, insight, and skill.  
 
arkhe (Greek): ‘beginning,’ both in a temporal sense and in the sense of a first principle 
or cause” (Warren 3). 
 
apeiron (Greek) - the boundless or unlimited, used to describe “the origin and nature 
from which come all the heavens and all the cosmoses within them” (Warren 29).  
 
nous (Greek): the mind, which pairs intellect with intuition for intuitive knowledge. 
physikoi (Greek): physicists. Aristotle called the pre-Socratics physikoi after physis the 
Greek word for nature because they sought natural explanations for phenomena, as 
opposed to the earlier theologoi (theologians), whose philosophical basis was 
supernatural.  
 
tao-chia - philosophical Taoism as distinguished from religious Taoism (tao-chiao), the 
original form of Taoist thought as expressed in the writings attributed to Laozi (ca 605 - 
531 BCE) in the Tao te Ching and later in the Basic Writings or Zhuangzi attributed to 
Zhuangzi (370 – 287 BCE). The focus of tao-chia is on unity with the Tao as a way of 
life and inner wisdom accessed by observing the natural flow of events in the physical 
world. Note that the Norton Anthology states: “only in the hands of Western polemicists 
did these terms have the power to separate philosophy from religion” (Miles et al. 1475). 
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